

An Enabling Framework for Civilian-Military Coordination and Cooperation in Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management: Challenges and Incremental Progress

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Online publication date: 30 November 2016

Suggested citation: M. A. Civic. 2016. An Enabling Framework for Civilian-Military Coordination and Cooperation in Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management: Challenges and Incremental Progress, *Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,* ed. C. Bruch, C. Muffett, and S. S. Nichols. London: Earthscan.

An enabling framework for civilian-military coordination and cooperation in peacebuilding and natural resource management: Challenges and incremental progress

Melanne A. Civic

Despite differences in culture and approach, civilian and military entities often have shared or overlapping goals in peacebuilding. By coordinating and cooperating, civilian and military entities can avoid duplication, make the best use of limited resources, and strengthen their chances of achieving shared objectives. Each partner brings different assets to the table: Civilian agencies' toolkits include diplomacy, mediation, and international development and subject-matter expertise, as well as knowledge exchange and collaboration among experts. The military has comparative advantages in tactical assets, contingency planning, rapid and efficient force generation, and resource appropriations, and tends to take a more pragmatic and direct approach to problem solving. Moreover, military doctrine is characterized by predictable processes, clear purpose, unified goals, and consistency over time, each of which may be lacking in civilian policy guidance.

Since the mid-1990s, in recognition of the potential value of civilian-military coordination, as well as interagency cooperation, a shift has occurred that favors (1) military engagement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding—including conflict prevention, stability and reconstruction operations, and related activities—and (2) collaboration between the military and executive-branch agencies of the U.S. government.

Beginning in the 1920s, various U.S. presidential and cabinet-level directives, planning templates, and policy initiatives have sought to promote coordination between civilian and military personnel. In parallel, U.S. foreign policy has been informed and strengthened by greater understanding of the relationship between

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natural resources and conflict, as well as by scientific research in the field of environmental management.[1]

Natural resource management consistently provides a platform for bilateral and multilateral cooperation among allies—for example, through collaborative research and the exchange of personnel and information. In fragile states, natural resources serve as a foundation for building governance capacity, and thereby strengthen and sustain peace. In fact, even when countries are in conflict, and diplomatic relations break down or are severed, cross-border natural resource management can keep the scientific and engineering communities engaged in dialogue, and may even allow for cooperation between them.[2] Moreover, because natural resource management cuts across peacebuilding sectors (such as security, justice, governance, economics, infrastructure, and social well-being), it is likely to engender coordinated and cooperative efforts.

Nevertheless, in the U.S. foreign policy community, natural resource management remains subsidiary to other activities that support peacebuilding, if it is recognized by policy makers as part of peacebuilding at all. Apart from agricultural development and certain types of energy generation and distribution (which are regarded as engines of economic development), the U.S. foreign policy community often regards natural resource management as a future aspiration, tangential to early-phase peacebuilding. Thus, management of natural resources tends to be segmented and sequenced; is addressed principally in the context of development, rather than diplomacy programs; and is marginalized in relation to other peacebuilding activities conducted by diplomats and military personnel. And despite greater efforts to coordinate across diplomacy and development programs—whereby, for example, diplomats may negotiate agreements on agriculture, energy, and freshwater sharing, and diplomatic initiatives may include funding for development programs—it is less common for diplomats to work collaboratively with their military counterparts on natural resource management, either in Washington or in the field.

As for the military role, apart from a few select examples, engagement typically begins and ends with providing security for humanitarian, diplomatic, and development programs and projects, natural resource related or otherwise. And where the military does have its own natural resource–related programs, such programs tend to emphasize security and to be designed as short-term,

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[1] In 2000, the position of science and technology advisor to the secretary of state (STAS) was created to complement that of the president's science advisor. The STAS works with a number of bureaus within the Department of State—including Oceans, Environment and Science (renamed Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs in 2011); Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs (renamed Economic and Business Affairs in 2011); and International Security and Nonproliferation—to consolidate and refine expert counsel to the secretary of state.

[2] For further discussion on transboundary cooperation by post-conflict countries around natural resources, see Bruch, Wolfarth, and Michalcik (2012); *a*olakhodži*d* et al. (2014); Mehyar et al. (2014); and Vardanyan and Volk (2014). See also the four chapters in part 6 (on confidence building) of this book.

quick-impact efforts that may not share the long-term sustainability goals of the civilian international development community.

This chapter traces the development of U.S. civilian-military coordination in peacebuilding, particularly with respect to natural resources. The chapter is divided into three major sections: (1) a brief history of U.S. civilian-military coordination and cooperation; (2) a discussion of natural resources in the context of civilian-military coordination and cooperation; and (3) a brief conclusion. Since the policy landscape of civilian-military coordination is dynamic, this chapter focuses on experiences and lessons through 2014.

U.S. CIVILIAN-MILITARY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION: A BRIEF HISTORY

In the United States, the civilian-military coordinated approach, first articulated in 1921, originated in doctrine that was based on the practices of the U.S. Marine Corps, which had engaged in a series of noncombat roles involving security, governance, and humanitarian relief (Harrington 1921). The approach was subsequently formalized in a 1940 publication, the *Small Wars Manual*, which called for civilian-military coordination across agencies. According to the manual, "[t]he efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end," and should include military, diplomatic, and host-nation participants (USMC 1940, para. 1-9(h), 16). Achieving agreement between these participants on the appropriate form for civilian-military coordination and cooperation has taken many decades, however, despite having been conscientiously addressed—not only by the U.S. government (during the Viet Nam War, and by the consecutive U.S. administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama), but also by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), numerous donor organizations, and a number of countries in addition to the United States.[3]

The U.S. government conceived the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in 1967, in an effort to counter the destabilizing effects of guerrilla insurgencies in Viet Nam. The program was designed to strengthen security through (1) the infusion of international aid and (2) the deployment of expert civilian and military advisors who could help implement governance, security, and economic programs. Through CORDS, civilian and military security goals, as well as personnel activities, were synchronized within a hierarchical structure with a single leadership chain and a unified mission. Civilian expert advisors were drawn from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which had been created in 1961, and from the departments of state, agriculture, commerce, and the treasury. Because funds for CORDS were pooled into a single budget, civilian and military personnel had to agree on program, resource allocation, and expenditure decisions.

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[3] The list of nations and entities that have addressed civilian-military cooperation includes Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union.

Nevertheless, CORDS was a relatively humble effort on the civilian side: at its height, it involved approximately 1,000 civilian experts, in contrast to 4,000 to 6,000 military personnel. In 1973, with U.S. military disengagement from Viet Nam, CORDS was phased out, and its various functions were reintegrated into the respective agencies and reduced in scope and resources. In the absence of the unifying imperative of the war, the differences among civilian and military agencies—with respect to both strategy and goals—resurfaced and took precedence over unity of purpose.[4] Thus, the importance of planning proactively for likely contingencies in peacebuilding and stability operations was overshadowed by a desire, on the part of both policy makers and the public, to believe that there would never again be the need or political will to engage in such an effort at that scale.

Despite the controversy over American involvement in Viet Nam, in the two decades that followed, the United States engaged in a series of international stability and reconstruction operations. In 1997, President William J. Clinton, in recognition of the multidimensional character of U.S. operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). Although the directive remains classified, the U.S. government released an accompanying white paper outlining the general principles of the directive (U.S. White House 1997):

- Establish a unified strategy and implement training for U.S. government officials.
- Collect lessons learned from peacebuilding operations.
- Integrate those lessons into improved training and planning for future engagements.

According to the white paper, the directive made explicit the policy goals of (1) minimizing U.S. military engagement, beyond a traditional combat role, in complex contingency operations,[5] and (2) avoiding open-ended engagements. Reducing military engagement in complex contingency operations would require a concomitant increase in the use of civilian experts (assuming that security conditions would permit the deployment of civilians) (U.S. White House 1997).

Over the ensuing years, however, the United States made little progress toward transforming PDD-56 into practice. Civilian experts were ill prepared

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[4] Opinions differ on the success and significance of CORDS. For a range of views, see White (2009), Honn et al. (2011), and Wynn (2000).

[5] As noted in the white paper, PDD-56 defines *complex contingency operations* to include humanitarian relief, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, as well as activities that are now classified as stability and reconstruction operations. Contingency operations undertaken in relation to humanitarian relief are in response to political instability or to conflict resulting from humanitarian disasters (U.S. White House 1997).

to serve as mentors alongside the military, in a conflict context, or to take on civilian administrative or advisory functions overseas. Furthermore, massive gaps in civilian-military coordination persisted with respect to both planning and activities. Such shortcomings were particularly evident in U.S. efforts to work with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan.[6]

By the mid-2000s, a coordinated approach to noncombat overseas operations was an idea whose time had come—not only in the United States but also in parts of Europe and across the international donor community. Coordination took various forms among peacebuilding, stabilization, and conflict-prevention partners, including both the intragovernmental (whole-of-government) approach and the comprehensive approach, the latter of which was characterized by intergovernmental and cross-organizational involvement.

In 2004, the United States conceived of the Secretary of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (U.S. DOS 2004), which was established by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), issued by President George W. Bush in 2005. Also in 2004, the United Kingdom established an interagency entity, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (renamed the Stabilisation Unit in 2006). In 2005, Canada created the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (known as START). That same year, the OECD conceived the whole-of-government approach, which involved "well sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains" (Upreti, Töpperwien, and Heiniger 2009, 73).

As originally conceived by the OECD, the whole-of-government approach called for a division of labor between the military security domain and the civilian political, diplomatic, development, and administrative domains; it also minimized military involvement in civilian peacebuilding activities. In U.S. practice, however, under certain permissive circumstances,[7] the approach evolved to the point where complementary military and civilian roles were coordinated or even integrated. At times, for example, civilian government staff have collaborated with military personnel in the planning, staffing, and execution of stability and reconstruction programs, most notably through provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) programs. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has transferred funds in support of civilian-led stabilization and reconstruction activities.

The UK Stabilisation Unit, which has implicitly operationalized OECD guidance, is an interagency entity that integrates civilian (diplomacy and development)

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[6] Peacebuilding covers a wide range of actions, from rebuilding civil society to disarmament, whereas peacekeeping usually involves the efforts of international forces to halt hostilities and enforce a peace agreement.

[7] A permissive environment is a secure one, in which the military and law enforcement authorities of the host country have established control of the country.

and military elements, is responsive to the policy decisions of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development, and operates through a budget shared by the three bodies. As a result, budgetary priorities and decisions are intrinsically collaborative and coordinated.

As a provider of subject-matter expertise for security, stability, and rule of law in countries transitioning from conflict, the Stabilisation Unit draws from its civilian and military government agencies, police in active service, and beyond (including experts in the private sector)—all of whom have been vetted, cleared, and trained, and are ready to deploy to field operations on short notice. Within stability operations, natural resource management is a technical subset of governance expertise, as is rule of law with respect to land use and the regulation and management of extractive industries. The Stabilisation Unit's integrated approach captures lessons from field operations, develops good practices that help shape future training and exercises, and informs policy development within the three ministries.

NSPD-44 officially empowered the secretary of state to lead the U.S. government's stability and reconstruction initiatives, which the secretary delegated to the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization within S/CRS. Although this presidential directive did not explicitly build on President Clinton's earlier directive, it was designed to address the same types of challenges, and established the policy imperative of "improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife" (U.S. White House 2005). NSPD-44 went further than PDD-56 by calling for a permanent structure to harmonize civilian and military post-conflict activities and placing it squarely under civilian leadership. Thus, S/CRS was conceived of as an organizational structure that would coordinate fully with the DOD in the reconstruction and stabilization of fragile states.

NSPD-44 also established a coordinating body—the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee—which was cochaired by the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization and a member of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The committee was tasked with overseeing agency coordination and cooperation, resolving policy issues, and deciding on unified action (U.S. White House 2005).

S/CRS worked within the framework of stabilization and reconstruction operations, as defined by NSPD-44, to thwart conflict or stabilize nations after conflict.[8] As head of S/CRS, the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization was charged with overseeing and facilitating the integration of all (1) military

[8] Neither S/CRS nor the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) (discussed later in this chapter) was designed specifically for humanitarian response, although S/CRS operates in coordination with humanitarian relief providers and the CRC may respond to conflict resulting from the instability engendered by a humanitarian crisis.

and civilian contingency planning and (2) civilian reconstruction and stabilization operations, in coordination with partner entities for a particular country, region, or area of concern. S/CRS coordinated policy across federal agencies at the assistant secretary level, through the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee—which met periodically, according to a schedule agreed on by the participating agencies.

To implement NSPD-44, S/CRS facilitated discussions between civilian agencies and the DOD; the end product of those discussions was the Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (U.S. DOS 2005b). The framework served as the foundation for the whole-of-government approach, establishing an improved process of coordination in operations, and for civilian-military planning. Under the framework, strategic, operational, and tactical planning were coordinated by civilian agencies with NSC oversight, and executed at the mission level. Further, civilian plans could be integrated into military objectives through combatant command planning,[9] once the plans had been approved by the NSC Deputies Committee or the NSC Principals Committee.[10]

To complement and support NSPD-44, the DOD issued a directive—Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05).[11] The directive was developed in consultation with the drafters of the civilian directive and raised stability operations to the level of a "core U.S. military mission that . . . shall be given priority comparable to combat operations" (U.S. DOD 2005, 2). DODD 3000.05 also mirrored the NSPD-44 provisions calling for civilian-military coordination: specifically, it required the DOD to coordinate with S/CRS (U.S. DOD 2005).

Although S/CRS was exclusively a civilian entity, military liaisons were included among its staff. In addition, S/CRS embodied the whole-of-government approach, as personnel from a number of agencies—including USAID, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Agriculture—were detailed to S/CRS: that is, they worked on assignment to S/CRS from their home agencies, and did so with greater regularity than was typical for Department of State or USAID bureaus and offices.

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[9] Combatant commands—led by combatant commanders—provide operational instructions and command and control to the armed forces in their theaters of operation. Although combatant commanders are neither members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the senior U.S. representatives in their respective theaters, they significantly influence how military personnel are organized, trained, and resourced.

[10] As the senior subcabinet interagency forum for national security–related policy, the NSC Deputies Committee may prescribe and review the work of NSC interagency groups and is tasked with helping to ensure that issues are properly analyzed and prepared for decision prior to review by the NSC or the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The NSC/PC is the senior interagency forum for national security-related policy (U.S. White House 2001).

[11] In 2009, DODD 3000.05 was reissued as DOD Instruction 3000.05.

Civilian subject-matter experts in security, infrastructure, economics, and rule of law, as well as civilian police, engaged in field operations; advised their government counterparts in host nations; coordinated across U.S. government agencies; engaged in military exercises and experiments, along with staff from international organizations; captured lessons and good practices; designed, executed, and engaged in specialized training; facilitated the development of whole-of-government policy toolkits, such as the Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM) and the Interagency Management System (IMS); and established the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), a standing civilian-surge agency.

The ETM is a whole-of-government planning framework that organizes peacebuilding, stabilization, and reconstruction tasks into sector-based categories and crosscutting sectors; embodies lessons learned through decades of field operations; and outlines the range of activities that are critical for planning, assessing, and implementing such efforts (U.S. DOS 2005a). During many months of discussion in 2005, subject-matter experts and others from USAID, various bureaus in the Department of State, and other domestic agencies drew upon their experiences to ensure that the ETM was as comprehensive as possible. Natural resource management tasks are integrated as integrated as crosscutting within the ETM.

In 2007, S/CRS facilitated the development of the IMS to organize the U.S. government's civilian capacity for conflict prevention and stabilization response. As a blueprint for coordinated engagement, the IMS provides interagency policy and program management for highly complex crises that involve widespread instability and may require military operations and engage multiple agencies (Herbst 2007). The IMS "clarifies roles, responsibilities, and processes for mobilizing and supporting interagency R&S [reconstruction and stabilization] operations" and provided a single structure under which civilians could be organized when called upon, in coordination with the military, to assist with highly complex crises (U.S. DOS 2007). Crises and potential crises that trigger the implementation of the IMS could come in many forms, including environmental destruction and natural resource competition, both of which can spark conflict.

Elements of NSPD-44 were legislatively authorized through Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (NDAA for 2009),[12] which (1) established under law the function of S/CRS within the Department of State and (2) authorized the development of the CRC,[13] a standing civilian-surge mechanism to respond to reconstruction and stabilization needs and to coordinate and cooperate with the military. The NDAA for 2009 also established the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), which serves as an informational and analytical bridge (1) between the DOD and

[12] Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110–417, 110th Cong. (October 14, 2008), sec. 1605.

[13] The CRC is discussed in further detail later in this chapter.

other government agencies within the foreign affairs community, and (2) between the DOD and academic institutions.[14]

Later, in its 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Obama administration explicitly declared that a whole-of-government approach was necessary for strengthening national security (U.S. White House 2010). The administration called upon the government to "update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power"—including defense, diplomacy, the economy, international development, homeland security, intelligence services, strategic communications, and the private sector (U.S. White House 2010, 14). The defense, diplomacy, and development aspects of this approach form the basis for U.S. civilian-military collaboration and U.S. cooperation with the international community. In support of the Obama administration's strategy, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton instituted a quadrennial diplomacy and development review (QDDR) to synchronize foreign policy and development goals and provide unified policy guidance.

The 2010 QDDR defined *civilian power* as "the government working as one, just as our military services work together as a unified force" (U.S. DOS and USAID 2010, ii), and emphasized civilian collaboration—not only across agencies, but also with the civilians and active military from the DOD. It also stressed the importance of diplomats and development experts working together, and called for coordination between USAID subject-matter experts and their counterparts in other agencies, such as the departments of energy, agriculture, justice, and health and human services. Finally, the QDDR touched on civilian-military collaboration, noting the policy drawbacks of relying on "civilian and military teams in the field to figure out how best to work together" and calling for "new ways and frameworks for working with the military" in conflict prevention and stabilization (U.S. DOS and USAID 2010, 123–124). As critics noted, however, other than identifying the issue and calling for a solution, the 2010 QDDR provided no specifics on how to strengthen civilian-military coordination and cooperation.[15]

In November 2011, S/CRS was subsumed by the newly created Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO bureau) (U.S. DOS 2011). The CSO bureau was established to strengthen the legacy of S/CRS; it was also intended to operate as the Department of State's whole-of-government apparatus for (1) informing policy and planning, (2) managing reconstruction and stabilization missions, and (3) managing the CRC (U.S. DOS 2013). It remains to be seen

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[14] In particular, the CCO addresses crosscutting issues at the nexus of civilian and military concerns; undertakes after-action analysis of civilian and joint civilian-military operations; conducts independent scholarly research and makes recommendations based on that research; and identifies lessons to inform both military doctrine and training for field operations. Because the CCO resides within the Institute for National and Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, it operates at arm's length from the DOD and other government agencies, and can exercise a measure of academic freedom and independence in analyzing lessons and recommending good practice.

[15] See, for example, Cordesman (2010) and Veillette (2010).

what the CSO bureau's approach will be, or how it will build on the interagency accomplishments of the S/CRS.[16]

NATURAL RESOURCES IN CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

Several mechanisms and initiatives are available to integrate natural resources into reconstruction and stabilization; these include the ETM, the CRC, interagency fund transfers, PRTs, and the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell.

The Essential Tasks Matrix

The ETM incorporates best practices and provides a menu of activities for practitioners to consider, choose among, and modify to suit the circumstances of a country or region. According to feedback from civilian and military partners, the ETM is viewed as a practical tool, and the exercise of bringing together an interagency team to develop the ETM set the stage for further interagency and military coordination (Moore and Fisher 2008).

In the ETM, natural resources are addressed under the rubric of transitional economics and infrastructure. Essential tasks involving natural resources are categorized as priorities in all ETM phases: phase one (initial responses); phase two (transformation); and phase three (sustainability). The most extensive treatment of natural resources in the ETM falls under the heading of market economy tasks, a subset of transitional economics and infrastructure that includes determining resource ownership, capturing natural resource revenues, maintaining control over extractive industries, and ensuring economic diversification. The two most prominent natural resource–related economic sectors in the ETM are agriculture and energy (both generation and management) (U.S. DOS 2005a).

Although natural resource management cuts across a number of sectors, it is addressed under other sectors primarily insofar as it advances economic stability: for example, securing natural resources is listed among the priorities for border security. Similarly, pollution controls and the regulation of extractive industries are both addressed under the rule of law, and natural resource management and watershed protection are addressed under governance capacity (U.S. DOS 2005a).

The approach to natural resources reflected in the ETM is revealing in two ways: First, the developers of the ETM—staff from USAID, the Department of State, and other domestic agencies—did not capture natural resource management as a sufficiently high priority in the task sequence to merit its own category or even a single subcategory. Second, because natural resource management is

[16] Starting in September 2014, CSO began transitioning to new leadership and began the process of reorganization and realignment of priorities.

addressed among the essential tasks primarily in relation to economic development and free-market expansion, the ETM fails to address key issues such as conservation and population displacement (whether triggered by deliberate or unintended harm). Furthermore, the developers of the ETM missed two opportunities: (1) to identify the unifying—and therefore peacebuilding—potential of scientific research and exchange in relation to natural resources, and (2) to recognize the importance of sustainable development, and the restoration and apportionment of natural resources, to peacebuilding. In keeping with this somewhat limited perspective, other policy tools subsequently developed for stabilization and conflict prevention have continued to address natural resources primarily as an economic concern—rather than as an opportunity for cooperation (Dziedzic, Sotirin, and Agoglia 2008), or for the protection and advancement of human rights.

The Civilian Response Corps

As noted earlier, Title XVI of the NDAA of 2009 authorized S/CRS to establish civilian-surge capacity to respond to immediate peacebuilding, reconstruction, and stabilization needs. The result was the CRC, an entity that is made up of experts from multiple federal agencies, thus applying the whole-of-government approach.[17] One of the functions of the CRC, which is funded through the budgets of the Department of State and USAID and coordinated by the Department of State, is to address the relationship between natural resources and human well-being.[18]

During the early development of the CRC concept, policy makers reasoned that the civilian-surge response needed to be civilian in every way; this goal was pursued so rigidly, however, that the corps not only excluded active military personnel but also civilian DOD employees.[19] Given the DOD's strong enthusiasm for S/CRS generally and the CRC specifically, the decision to exclude civilian DOD staff from the CRC was a missed opportunity to engage in planning and field team collaborations, and thereby a missed opportunity to create a mutually supportive system that would capitalize on the complementarity of assets, enhance sustainability overall, and generally mitigate corporate cultural differences.

In particular, USACE, which is made up of civilian personnel, is a fitting ally for peacebuilding initiatives, including infrastructure construction and natural resource management. For example, USACE's Reserve Support to Disaster Relief Operations is an exceptional program in which short-term civil engineering and

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[17] For more detailed information about the creation, development, and functions of the CRC, see Stigall (2010), Serafino (2012), and Farr (2014).

[18] USAID receives congressional funding for its CRC personnel as part of the USAID budget. The Department of State was authorized to reimburse other participating agencies for their CRC staff.

[19] The exception—as the authorizing language has been interpreted—is uniformed service personnel from the Department of Commerce, who may be members of the CRC.

disaster relief projects are implemented by civilian engineers, working in partnership with military reservists who have relevant skills and expertise.

More broadly, judge advocate general officers and civil affairs officers from the military have historically engaged in civilian-type stability and reconstruction operations—either independently or in partnership with their civilian counterparts.[20] In an environment in which one of the goals is to coordinate, if not integrate, military and civilian efforts, excluding the military services and civilian DOD personnel perpetuates an arcane concern—namely, that Congress and the public would view direct involvement of the DOD as the militarization of foreign affairs and foreign aid programs, instead of viewing it as the civilianization of the military in its peacebuilding capacity under DODD 3000.05. In fact, embedding an active or reserve civil affairs officer with expertise in environmental science, for example, within a CRC team would leverage the assets of both military and civilian institutions, and integrate military-style planning, training, and readiness into the CRC.

The CRC was designed to have three distinct, mutually supporting components: active, standby, and reserve. In 2006, S/CRS piloted an active and standby corps consisting exclusively of Department of State personnel: a dozen or so personnel with specialized skills were recruited to S/CRS, and approximately 200 standby personnel (drawn from throughout the Department of State) were prepared to deploy as needed. Members of the initial active corps participated in planning, conflict prevention, and stability operations in countries emerging from or on the verge of conflict, including Georgia, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Sudan; a few standby members were also deployed to Chad and Sudan, among other locations.

In September 2008, to institutionalize coordination with agencies that had participated informally in interagency stabilization and reconstruction efforts since 2005, S/CRS opened the active and standby components of the CRC to interagency partners. The first nine months after this decision (before passage of congressional authorization) were characterized by delicate negotiations to develop a framework agreement defining the duties and the mutual responsibilities of S/CRS and the participating agencies.[21] The original core group included USAID

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[20] The judge advocate general and civil affairs active and reserve components of the U.S. military already promote cross-agency cultural understanding through training and graduate educational programs that are collaboratively designed and taught by civilian and military personnel.

[21] U.S. government agencies routinely formalize collaboration and personnel exchanges through such framework agreements or memoranda, which are essentially policy statements specifying the intent, duties, responsibilities, and commitments of the agencies involved. NSPD-44 provided the policy basis for the CRC, and long-standing congressional authorizations, such as the Economy Act (Public Law U.S.C. sec. 1535, 72nd Congress, U.S. Code [1932]), were used to create a fee-for-service mechanism under which executive agencies could obtain supplies or services from other executive agencies.

and the departments of state, agriculture, commerce, health and human services, homeland security, justice, transportation, and the treasury. Shortly thereafter, the Department of the Treasury withdrew from the CRC, and the Department of Energy—which had been absent from the original group—joined, albeit exclusively in a standby capacity.[22]

Although the military has historically recognized the links between energy, security, and stability, the civilian agencies that participated in the interagency CRC had overlooked the importance of the connection. Greater civilian-military coordination during the consultative task force phase, when plans were made to expand the CRC beyond S/CRS, might have averted this oversight. Energy is among the most basic services required for stability and is inextricably linked to national security; in recognition of energy's role in stability and security, both the United States and its allies have undertaken energy-related projects to support counterinsurgency efforts.[23]

Members of the Active Component of the CRC, as defined by congressional authorization, are full-time U.S. government personnel employed by their home agencies. Their primary duties involve training for, planning for, providing direct support to, and conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. Active members commit to being available to deploy worldwide within forty-eight hours of call-up.

Members of the Standby Component of the CRC, who also are defined as full-time government personnel, have skills in areas that are relevant to the reconstruction of fragile states, such as irrigation or public health, and provide supplemental expertise for the Active Component.[24] Unlike those of the active corps, the day-to-day duties of the standby corps, while applicable to stabilization and reconstruction, may be either international or domestic in character. The preparatory requirements for standby corps include several weeks of training during the first year; additional training in subsequent years; security and medical clearances; and a commitment from the individual (approved by the agency) to

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[22] Additional agencies may choose to participate in the CRC, by consensus of participating assistant secretaries and the cochairs of the Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee.

[23] Electrification was considered so important to stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq that the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence established the Energy Fusion Cell to develop a rational and comprehensive energy policy for the oil, gas, and water resource sectors.

[24] The Standby Component draws on the international response capabilities of USAID and other civilian agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps, which has expertise in earth sciences, oceanography, meteorology, fisheries, and engineering; the Department of Health and Human Services; and the Public Health Service. The Department of State reimburses other agencies for the cost of using the services of standby members (salary, overhead, and possible backfill costs, in the case of lengthy deployments), with the exception of USAID, which draws on its own response readiness appropriations.

be available for deployment within thirty days of a formal decision made by the interagency policy committee.[25]

In keeping with the whole-of-government approach, the 2010 QDDR calls for greater integration across agencies; specifically, it calls for civilian DOD staff to be included within the CRC, a requirement that overturned the previous policy decision. Standby CRC teams could be used to pilot such integrated efforts.

With respect to natural resources, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee allocated five experts from the Department of Agriculture (USDA) that could deploy to the Active Component of the CRC. For the Standby Component, there were approximately forty agricultural experts. Other natural resource experts may be drawn from the Department of Energy (on a standby basis only), USAID, or the Department of Commerce, which has significant expertise in climate change mitigation and ocean management.

The original plan for the CRC also included a Reserve Component: experts would be drawn from state and local government and the private sector, and were to have been trained and equipped to serve as temporary U.S. government staff when called up for duty. The purpose of the Reserve Component was to provide access to highly specialized skills and capabilities that might be needed in substantial numbers, in the event of a significant surge. Because it would have represented a broad base of highly specialized experts, including those in natural resource management, this component had the greatest potential for response capability in the realm of natural resources, which otherwise tends not to be assigned immediate priority in stability operations.

In tight budgetary times, however, a civilian reserve—which had potential, rather than immediate or impending use—was difficult to justify, despite the fact that the costs associated with developing and maintaining it would have been primarily administrative and transactional.[26] Since the Reserve Component was to have been open to all U.S. citizens who were not federal employees, including military reservists, the component would also have presented an opportunity to use the expertise of military reservists.[27] Ultimately, the notion of a civilian reserve became aspirational: although the authorizing legislation that established the CRC called for reports on progress toward the development

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[25] Under procedures outlined in the 2010 QDDR, the decision to deploy members of the Standby Component is to be made by the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee or a comparable successor entity.

[26] Members of the Reserve Component would have been paid salaries as temporary U.S. government employees only when they were engaged in required predeployment activities or actually deployed. Costs to maintain the reserve would have included human resources vetting and processing, security and medical clearances, and tuition for training. As temporary U.S. government employees, reserve members on active duty could have executed governmental functions, including making fiscal decisions and managing U.S. government personnel; outside contractors are prohibited from engaging in such activities.

[27] If reservists had been called up for active military duty, those responsibilities would have trumped any commitment to the CRC.

of the reserve, Congress did not allocate funds to create the third component of the CRC.[28]

Interagency fund transfers and shared funding mechanisms

Interagency fund transfers are a third means of promoting civilian-military coordination in the natural resource sector. Such transfers are a routine means, within the federal government, of supporting programs of mutual interest: one agency uses its appropriated funds to pay another agency to execute a program. Most often, the agency that provides the funds maintains some control over the program, either by granting broad approval or by participating—along with the agency receiving the funds—in program design. Examples of such fund transfers include the DOD's section 1207 funds (Serafino 2011), USAID's alternative development programs, and the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

Coordination is strengthened when the immediate goals of different entities overlap. This is the case, for example, with security sector reform, which is handled by the departments of defense, homeland security, justice, and state. It is also the case for the development of livelihood alternatives (for example, alternatives to poppy cultivation), which is addressed by the Department of the Treasury, USAID, USDA, and other agencies. Similarly, a range of activities—including agriculture, aquaculture, and water projects (for example, to clean up pollution or restore flow) and the establishment of energy and farm cooperatives—also strengthen the security and governance sectors.

In an approach that is rare in the U.S. government but is regularly practiced in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the international community, multiple entities draw on a single funding mechanism. For example, the Conflict Prevention Pool of the British Stabilisation Unit is a cross-government fund shared by programs and projects sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Because they share a single funding mechanism, the agencies must coordinate and cooperate to achieve common goals. Examples of multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), an approach to pooled funding used in the international community, include the Topical Trust Fund on Managing Natural Resource Wealth and the MDTF for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (IMF 2010).

Section 1207 funding

For fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee authorized the DOD to use monies from the Global Security Contingency Fund to provide the Department of State with up to US$100 million per year in funding for conflict prevention, stabilization, reconstruction, security transition initiatives, and related purposes. Specifically, the funds—known as section 1207

[28] The CRC, while existing on paper, was effectively discontinued in May 2014.

funding—could be used to support programs carried out by USAID, the Department of State, U.S. embassies, or combatant commands.[29] The funding enabled civilian agency and military personnel to cooperate directly on short-term projects, and thereby gain a better understanding of each other's priorities and strategies with respect to mutually agreed-on efforts to advance stability.

S/CRS and DOD's Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations jointly developed guidelines for project selection, and the projects were coordinated through the U.S. embassies located in the respective host countries. The evaluation process was a civilian-military collaboration executed by the Technical Advisory Committee, which was cochaired by S/CRS and DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The committee was made up of representatives from OSD, the Department of State's Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, and the Strategy and Policy Directorate of the U.S. Joint Forces Command; USAID is a nonvoting member.[30] Because section 1207 funding is not dedicated, all recommended proposals were subject to funding availability. During fiscal year 2006, the first year in which the funding was available, a period of "bureaucratic confusion" led to delays in the submission of proposals (OIG 2007, 11), and only a fraction of the funding was committed. This underutilization created greater impetus for civilians to coordinate with the DOD to maximize the use of section 1207 funds.

Plan Colombia, a 2010 USAID program funded by section 1207 funds, provides an example of civilian-military coordination with a natural resource element. The goal of the program was to counter the destabilizing influences of drug-trafficking organizations by improving economic development and government service delivery in Colombia. One pillar of the program was the improvement of water systems in critical areas—to enhance quality of life, strengthen governance capacity, and increase popular confidence in the Colombian government (USAID n.d.).

Plan Colombia: A USAID alternative development program

Between 2005 and 2008, through one of its alternative development programs in Colombia, USAID provided development assistance to support livelihoods that offered viable alternatives to narcotics trafficking (U.S. GAO 2008). Specifically, the natural resource aspect of Plan Colombia included the improvement of water systems, particularly in remote rural regions; it also supported the

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[29] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-63, 109th Cong. (January 6, 2006); John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Public Law 109-364, 109th Cong. (October 17, 2006). The funds are designated by the number of the authorizing section in the NDAA. Thus, in fiscal year 2008, the original section number, 1207, was changed to 1210.

[30] Proposals approved by the Technical Advisory Committee are recommended to the DOD for funding approval; DOD approval is subject to congressional concurrence.

Forest Guardian Families Program,[31] environmental protection, the development of agroforestry and other integrative systems,[32] and the conservation of Colombia's national parks. The agricultural development and natural resource protection elements of the program were coordinated with (1) the Department of State's Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement (now the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) and (2) DOD efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and reform the Colombian security sector.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program

An unusual circumstance that occurred during combat in Iraq led to the creation of a funding initiative that was distinct from shared appropriations. In 2003, U.S. forces discovered millions of dollars in cash belonging to Saddam Hussein's Baathist Party. After having determined that most of the funds had originally been obtained in violation of United Nations sanctions, U.S. Central Command announced that coalition forces could take possession of and safeguard them as movable property of the State of Iraq. The funds initially were put to use through the Brigade Commander's Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People (Martins 2004); when the Coalition Provisional Authority took over Iraq's transitional governance system, the program was renamed the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and was linked to new governing law and authority relating to Iraqi property.[33]

CERP funds could be used to support urgent humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and stabilization, but could not be used for the direct support of security forces.[34] In the realm of natural resources, CERP funding was used to support infrastructure development, such as the construction of irrigation systems and multimillion-dollar water purification plants.

Differences in civilian and military perspectives on CERP's ultimate purpose, along with distinct agency missions, led to differences of opinion on

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[31] In 2003, in response to environmental degradation and increasing levels of violence, both caused by the cultivation of illegal crops, the Colombian government created the Forest Guardian Families Program, which offers social and technical support, along with economic incentives, to families who substitute legal for illegal crops.

[32] Agroforestry is the integration of agriculture and forestry, to enhance diversity and sustainability.

[33] In the context of foreign occupation, U.S. military operations are regulated primarily under the Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, August 12, 1949). For a critical review of CERP, see Osterhout (2011). The framework of the program was later expanded to Afghanistan, where appropriated funds were used to support PRTs.

[34] At least US$2.8 billion in CERP funds is reported to have been spent in Iraq over the life of the program. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 allocated US$1.3 billion to CERP for Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010 alone (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, 111th Cong. [October 28, 2009]); see also U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (2009).

the appropriate use of CERP funds. The military viewed CERP funds as part of the Money as a Weapons System—that is, as a nonkinetic, nonlethal weapon program to support counterinsurgency efforts (CALL 2009b).[35] Civilian agency officials tended to regard CERP as a source of support for longer-term development and peacebuilding.

Military commanders had ultimate decision making authority on the use of CERP funds. Feedback from civilian returnees from PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, revealed some frustration with CERP project selection; some returnees expressed the view that CERP projects were being used as a stop-gap tool to buy peace, and were not being fully integrated with other funding mechanisms, such as USAID programs.[36]

Provincial reconstruction teams

Side-by-side engagement—whether through training, exercises, or service in theater—is the most collegial way to promote civilian-military coordination. This principle is reflected in PRTs, which brought together personnel from the military, the Department of State, USAID, and specialized domestic agencies. First piloted in Afghanistan and then implemented, in a modified form, in Iraq, PRTs supported local counterinsurgency efforts by assisting with development goals (U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2007).

The PRT system in Afghanistan grew out of the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells program, which first established cells in early 2002 (Perito 2005); by 2003, the first PRTs were operational. PRTs provided an opportunity for international civilian-military cooperation through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which ultimately came under the control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see figure 1 for ISAF regional commands in Afghanistan prior to 2010). PRTs in Afghanistan were led and staffed by various donor countries.[37] U.S. PRTs were led by the military; each also had a civilian deputy from the Department of State, and a relatively small number of civilian staff with development or subject-matter expertise (Perito 2005). PRTs were implemented in Iraq in 2005, where they were operated almost exclusively by the United States. Unlike the PRTs in Afghanistan, each PRT in Iraq was under civilian leadership from the Department of State, with a military deputy.

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[35] "Warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations" (CALL 2009b; see also CALL 2009a).

[36] See USIP (2005) and Alexander (2010).

[37] International Security Assistance Force partners that led or participated in PRTs in Afghanistan include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.



Figure 1. Regional command and control in Afghanistan prior to July 2010
Source: ISAF (2010).

The second generation of PRTs were ePRTs. Introduced in Iraq in 2007, ePRTs were distinguished from traditional PRTs in two principal ways: (1) their missions focused on capacity building at a more local level, and (2) they gained access to small communities by being embedded in brigade combat teams (BCTs) or U.S. Marine Corps regimental combat teams. Being "embedded" meant that each ePRT lived and worked within a combat team's assigned area of operation. The combat team provided ePRTs with logistical and security support, and ePRTs operated as part of the BCT commander's staff (Naland 2011).

Another notable difference between PRTs and ePRTs was their civilian leadership structure. At the height of ePRT utilization, each ePRT had between eight and twenty members, including a Department of State team leader, a U.S. Army or U.S. Marine Corps deputy team leader, a USAID officer, a USDA officer, several private-sector subject-matter experts contracted by the Department of State, interpreters, and military support personnel (Naland 2011). With this structure, civilians generally outnumbered military personnel (Perito 2007).[38]

Two ePRT programs, the Babil Province Fish Farm and the Central Euphrates Farmers Market, both undertaken in Babil Province, in central Iraq, offer

[38] As the troop drawdown in Iraq progressed, some BCTs evolved into advisory and assistance brigades (U.S. Forces—Iraq n.d.).

successful examples of civilian-military collaboration in peacebuilding and natural resource management. The stated goal of each program was counterinsurgency, which was to progress to longer-term development and peacebuilding (Naland 2011). The two programs were initiated in the spring of 2008, shortly after the U.S. Army had cleared the province of al Qaeda forces; both programs were conducted in partnership with the government of Iraq, local government agencies, and the Iraqi private sector. Military and civilian counterparts collaboratively planned and designed the programs, drawing on the assets and strengths of the various agencies and entities involved.

Although the area was secure, local industry—primarily fish farming—had been devastated, and local populations had no means of obtaining licit livelihoods. The local government had also been weakened, leaving the population vulnerable. The ePRT began by consulting with local government and residents to assess the community's needs; from these discussions, it became clear that the priorities were to restore the fish-farming industry and establish a cooperative farmers' market.

The entire ePRT was involved, including the Department of State team leader; military civil affairs officers; and technical experts from USACE, USDA, and USAID. The U.S. Army provided security for the trucks and construction teams, and a U.S. Army civil affairs team provided small grants and technical experts, including interpreters and cultural advisors. To mitigate damage from pollution (which had been caused by years of fighting) and to get clean water flowing to the farms, USACE repaired the pond levies and installed water purification systems. USDA personnel served as technical advisors for the farmers' cooperative, and USAID staff provided guidance on business plans, cash flow, marketing, and the administration of cooperative business ventures.

Both the fish farm and the farmers' market included plans for revolving funds, to ensure future sustainability. The ePRT hired a local resident to interact regularly with the farmers and serve as a liaison between ePRT personnel and local residents. The ePRT consulted with local government leaders and the public throughout the process, and followed through on the consultations as the projects progressed, engendering local support and ensuring direct local involvement in decision making and execution.

Although the Babil Province ePRT initiative was deemed a success overall, neither the process nor the outcome were without controversy. Broadly speaking, there were some differences of opinion as to approach. The military favored small grants, to get the project moving quickly and produce rapid results in the short term (in the range of three months). USAID, looking ahead to the longer term (a year or more), argued for cash or in-kind microloans, to establish a local stake in the outcome and create a revolving, self-sustaining fund for financial credit for the community. More specifically, a former ePRT member has questioned the ability or willingness of the Department of State and the U.S. Army to consider the unintended effects of program funding on the balance of power—and therefore stability, in this rural area—in particular, the potential of such programs to increase "the power, prestige, or influence of a particular sheikh

or tribe in one area while simultaneously decreasing the influence of another" (Stone 2010, 153).

The Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell

The Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC) was a joint effort of DOD and civilian government agencies that focused on developing community-strengthening natural resource–based programs in Afghanistan. The NRCC was funded by the DOD, primarily through CERP, and implemented through local civil society and nongovernmental organizations. From January 2010 to May 2011, the NRCC operationalized the whole-of-government approach—specifically, the DOD, the Department of State, USAID, and USDA worked jointly in eastern Afghanistan (Bader 2010).

Under the NRCC, local elders selected natural resource programs in accordance with local needs; programs included water conservation and erosion control efforts. The programs were designed, executed, and assessed by local young men who might otherwise have been recruited by extremist groups. Involvement in the program was merit-based, and training was rigorous: the intent was to create an elite group that would be highly appealing to young men, and to thereby dissuade them from engaging in combat or aligning with extremists. The NRCC structure was designed to be adaptable to varied circumstances; however, largely because of shifting political priorities, it has not been replicated.[39]

CONCLUSION

A truly integrated civilian-military approach incorporates the full range of available skills and assets—combining strategic vision with tactical understanding, policy expertise with technical know-how, and a military perspective with a civilian outlook. By merging diverse perspectives and resources, such an approach takes advantage of civilian and military strengths and expands the range of tools that can be used to meet the challenges of peacebuilding. An integrated civilian-military approach holds great promise for effective and efficient reconstruction and stabilization, particularly in the natural resource sector.

The administration of George W. Bush took a substantial step toward integration by raising stability and reconstruction operations to the level of a core military activity and formally integrating civilians into military operations. Nevertheless, in practical terms, greater integration of civilian and military programs and activities continues to be a challenge. To date, efforts have ranged from coordinating activities that are funded by a single source to side-by-side

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[39] Among the reasons for the failure to replicate the NRCC in other contexts are the following: the level of human and financial resources required to obtain the necessary understanding of local culture; the difficulty of gaining the trust of local communities; and the challenge of working through local organizations.

engagement. Such efforts have been marred, however, by missed opportunities, incomplete integration with other initiatives, uncoordinated funding cycles, failure to anticipate consequences, and the absence of a shared vision.

Civilian and military participants in CERP, for example, held differing views about objectives and timelines, and CERP-funded projects have not been meaningfully integrated with related activities. In the case of PRTs and ePRTs, coordination between the military and USAID was complicated by differences in the time horizons of each institution. There may also be a need, when working with local community leaders, for greater sensitivity to potential effects on the local balance of power. Finally, two instances of shortsightedness led to missed opportunities for greater coordination—specifically, the exclusion of DOD civilians, particularly those in USACE, from the CRC, and the failure to integrate CERP projects and other funding mechanisms.

Experiences so far offer lessons on how civilian-military cooperation can be further refined. Consolidating funding sources and expanding fund-sharing systems, for example, can help break down institutional and cultural divides by necessity, and ultimately establish trust. Similarly, drawing from the same funding source leads to integration because it requires joint assessments and decision making about project selection. Selection processes for DOD funding, including section 1207 funds and CERP funds, demonstrate the possibilities for civilian and military collaboration.

Previous planning and operational cooperation can also be built on. The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq offered two social laboratories, of sorts, for civilian-military coordination, if not collaboration. The ePRT model, in Iraq—the best example of a genuinely joint endeavor—demonstrates the potential strength of diverse skills and assets, and of the whole-of-government approach. While the ePRT model would be improved by increased integration of third parties (such as USAID personnel) and greater attention to long-term vision and cultural conditions, it demonstrates the feasibility of civilian-military cooperation. The NRCC demonstrated the potential for positive results from a coordinated, civilian-military program designed to foster local engagement and secure local implementation.

The transition to civilian-military coordination and cooperation is neither smooth nor lateral. The process is characterized by periodic shifts—in particular, pullback from civilian agencies that are cautious about the militarization of foreign assistance, development, and diplomacy. By capitalizing on mutual interests in peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and stabilization, natural resource management offers a less politicized platform for cooperation, with benefits to both the host nation and regional and international security.

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