This chapter first appeared in *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding,* edited by P. Lujala and S.A. Rustad. It is one of 6 edited books on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management (for more information, seewww.environmentalpeacebuilding.org). Thefull book can be ordered from Routledge athttp://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781849712309/.

© 2012. Environmental Law Institute and United Nations Environment Programme.



An inescapable curse? Resource management, violent conflict, and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta

Annegret Mähler[a]
[a]***German Institute of Global and Area Studies***

Online publication date: June 2012

Suggested citation: A. Mähler. 2012. An inescapable curse? Resource management, violent conflict, and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. In *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding,*ed. P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad. London: Earthscan.

Terms of use: This chapter may be used free of charge for educational and non-commercial purposes. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) only, and do not necessarily represent those of the sponsoring organizations.

An inescapable curse? Resource management, violent conflict, and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta

Annegret Mähler

The Niger Delta is home to nearly thirty million people and to the greatest concentration of oil production in the country. Since 1999, when Nigeria transitioned to democracy, the central government has undertaken three major resource management initiatives for the conflict-ridden region:

- The reform of the derivation formula, which regulates the distribution of oil revenue.
- The establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission and the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan.
- The creation of the Ministry of the Niger Delta and the launching of the Niger Delta Technical Committee.[1]

The intent of the initiatives was to reduce violence and to improve socioeconomic conditions in the delta.[2] While studies by Philippe Le Billon (2008) and the United Nations Environment Programme (2009) have demonstrated that natural resource management may contribute to peacebuilding, in the case of the Niger Delta, such policies have so far had little success.[3] Indeed, violence and forced displacements have increased significantly since the end of the 1990s, causing tremendous social and economic damage. In 2008, more than 1,000 people were

---

Annegret Mähler is a research fellow at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany.

[1] Although there were a few initiatives before 1999, they were not substantial, and the military government's response to increasing unrest in the Niger Delta was dominated by harsh military repression. The democratization that occurred in 1999 therefore seems to be a sound starting point for assessing resource management initiatives.

[2] The Niger Delta is located in southern Nigeria. As defined in this chapter, the region includes nine states: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers.

[3] For more information on the causal relationship between natural resources and violence, see Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, "High-Value Natural Resources: A Blessing or Curse for Peace," the introductory chapter of this book.



killed—a historical peak (IRIN 2009b). With a view to providing insights for improving future resource management in the Niger Delta and beyond, this chapter explores the reasons for the limited success of the initiatives.

The failure to reduce violence and improve socioeconomic conditions in the delta—and thereby establish a durable peace—can be attributed to four main causes:

- Conceptual weaknesses in the initiatives themselves, which failed to adequately address the complex political, social, and economic causes of the conflicts—in particular, the socioeconomic distortions caused by the oil industry's effects on employment.
- The weakness of political institutions, which undermines the effectiveness of all government initiatives.
- The presence of an oil-based "economy of violence" that is fostered by a number of parties—including politicians, security forces, local authorities, and international actors—that have a vested interest in continued conflict.
- The government's military intervention in the delta, which has been marked by the disproportionate use of violence and is drawing segments of the Niger Delta population into active or passive support for militant groups.

The chapter is divided into six major sections: (1) a brief history of the conflict; (2) a discussion of the central resource management initiatives; (3) an evaluation of the initiatives' effects on socioeconomic development and violent conflict;



(4) an examination of general constraints on the outcomes of the initiatives; (5) a list of lessons learned; and (6) recommendations for next steps.

CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA: A BRIEF HISTORY

Commercial oil production began in Nigeria in 1956, four years before the country became independent. By 1970, oil production already accounted for more than 50 percent of the country's export revenues; by the end of the 1970s, it accounted for about 95 percent (UN Comtrade n.d.). Since then, the high dependence on oil has changed little; in 2005, for example, oil revenues accounted for 88 percent of government income (Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz 2007).

Ever since oil production in the Niger Delta began, the area has suffered from violent, oil-related conflicts. The attempted secession of Biafra, which is situated within the Niger Delta, led to a bloody civil war (1967–1970) that was motivated—

not exclusively, but strongly—by disputes between the federal government and the regional political and military elites over the sharing of oil revenues (Harneit-Sievers 1992; Oyefusi 2007).[4]

Between the mid-1970s and the end of military rule, in 1999, the central government gradually reduced the share of oil revenues allotted to producing states. The struggle between the federal government and regional activists over what constitutes fair distribution remains one of the central causes of conflict in the Niger Delta.

In addition to fueling violence, oil exploitation in the Niger Delta has had disastrous ecological consequences: massive contamination of water resources, destruction of farmland, and dispersion of toxic substances (Obi 2001). Between 1986 and the end of the 1990s, distress associated with environmental damage was exacerbated by a deep economic crisis that led to a rise in unemployment and poverty. Between 1985 and 1995, the portion of the Niger Delta population living in poverty rose from 44 to 59 percent (UNDP 2006). The government responded to the economic crisis by introducing, in 1986, a structural adjustment program that involved deep cuts in public expenditures for health and education.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the combination of environmental damage and harsh economic circumstances had led to increasing grassroots mobilization (Ukeje 2003). The struggle first gained international attention when Ken Saro-Wiwa founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). In 1990, MOSOP presented its manifesto, the Ogoni Bill of Rights,[5] to the government and the people of Nigeria. The document demanded fair compensation for oil pollution, a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, and more political autonomy for the Ogoni people. Although MOSOP was a nonviolent movement, it encountered severe governmental repression; Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow activists were executed, several hundred other activists were detained, whole villages were devastated, and numerous people were killed (Ibeanu and Mohammed 2001).[6] By 1995, the government had succeeded in crushing the protest movement, and the level of conflict in the Niger Delta dropped temporarily—but the root causes of the conflicts remained.

In March 1997, a decade-long dispute between the Itsekiri, the Urhobo, and the Ijaw peoples over the ownership of Warri, a town located in Delta State, was reignited by the creation of a new jurisdiction known as Warri South West, and

---

[4] On May 30, 1967, after the central government put in place a territorial realignment that implied that the Igbo majority would lose control over the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta, the Biafran region, under the command of the Igbo military governor Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared its independence.

[5] The Ogoni Bill of Rights can be viewed at www.waado.org/nigerdelta/RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html.

[6] In addition, it has been reported that the military regime, under General Sani Abacha, triggered violent boundary conflicts between the Ogoni people and other ethnic groups (Ibeanu and Mohammed 2001; Human Rights Watch 1995). According to Human Rights Watch (1995), for example, Nigerian soldiers participated in secret military raids that were designed to look like violent intercommunal conflicts, and government soldiers joined with Andoni fighters in attacking Ogoni villages.

the location of its headquarters in an Itsekiri area rather than in an Ijaw area (Human Rights Watch 2003). The ethnic violence was indirectly linked to oil, however: private oil companies had assigned disproportionately high financial benefits to the Itsekiri people, intensifying interethnic resentment (Human Rights Watch 1999).[7] In addition, in order to attract public attention to the demands for local control of oil revenues, some local activists—mainly Ijaw youths—seized oil installations and took staff hostage. The conflict over Warri cost hundreds of lives (Bergstresser 1998; Human Rights Watch 2003).

Since the Warri crisis, a complex interplay of interethnic and intercommunal conflicts has continued to feed periodic violent eruptions throughout the Niger Delta. This violence has been marked, since the late 1990s, by an increase in hostage taking (ICG 2006a) and in the sabotage of oil pipelines (Zinn 2005). Clashes with government security forces—notorious for human rights violations and for their immoderate use of force (Human Rights Watch 1999, 2002, 2006)—have also increased, destroying the credibility of the government in the delta and fostering increasingly violent responses from militant youth groups.

Although there is no question that oil has played a major role in violent conflict in the Niger Delta, oil fails to provide an exhaustive explanation of the violence.[8] There are essentially three roots of the conflict, all of which predate the oil era: cultural and political cleavages, weak political institutions, and an as-yet unconsolidated statehood (World Bank 2003). Nevertheless, oil continues to serve as an additional trigger for conflict:

- The massive environmental damage that has resulted from oil production has created a tremendous sense of grievance.
- Struggles over the distribution of oil revenues have exacerbated interethnic and intercommunal conflict.
- By causing distortions in the national economy, oil has indirectly increased the risk of violent conflict.[9]

---

[7] In the absence of a responsible state, some oil companies had began to provide—partly unofficially—financial assistance to their host communities to pacify them.

[8] The following findings are based on a research project of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies; the research was funded by the DFG (German Research Foundation) and supervised by Dr. Matthias Basedau.

[9] Since the 1970s, because of its almost total dependence on oil exports, Nigeria has increasingly suffered from "Dutch disease"; at the same time, financial mismanagement has been rampant. As noted in the text, the deep economic crisis that began in 1986 led to rising unemployment and poverty in the 1990s; see Mähler (2010) for details. (*Dutch disease* is a phenomenon in which the discovery of substantial natural resource wealth negatively affects a nation's economy. The discovery often causes sudden appreciation in the value of the nation's currency—which, in turn, decreases the nation's competitiveness in the international commodity markets. This reduces the country's exports of manufactured and agricultural commodities and increases its imports. At the same time, the natural resource sector draws a substantial share of domestic resources such as labor and materials, increasing their cost to other sectors. Moreover, when the initially booming resource sector eventually declines, the non-resource-based sectors may find it difficult to recover.)

- By funding patronage networks, oil has further corrupted Nigeria's weak political institutions.
- By indirectly funding militant groups, oil serves as a catalyst for violence.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES

Although the government's initial (and continuing) response to conflict in the Niger Delta was military suppression, this strategy has been accompanied by peacebuilding and conflict-prevention initiatives, especially since democratization in 1999. For example, the government has launched various law enforcement initiatives, including the seizure of weapons and machinery and the prosecution of arms smugglers, and has agreed to periodic (and usually short) cease-fires.

The government has also intensified efforts to build peace by reforming resource management. As noted earlier, the three principal initiatives in this area are the reform of the derivation formula; the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission and the development of the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan; and the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta.[10]

Reform of the derivation formula

The derivation formula determines the share of oil revenues distributed to the regions where the oil was extracted. Until the end of the 1960s, the producing states received a share of 50 percent. In the wake of Nigeria's political and fiscal centralization,[11] this percentage was steadily reduced: from 45 percent (1969–1975), to 20 percent (1975–1979), to between 0 and 3 percent (1979–1999) (UNDP 2006). With the transition to democracy, in 1999, the share was increased to 13 percent.

Although per capita oil revenue is relatively small in Nigeria, even a 13 percent stake is by no means marginal, especially in view of the strong increase in the price of oil in recent years. The derivation formula is set forth in the Nigerian constitution, but there are no regulations dictating how the revenues should be spent (ANEEJ 2004), and there are hardly any local or regional mechanisms of fiscal control (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Because of the southern states' persistent discontent with the derivation formula, reform of the formula became the topic of debate in 2005, at the National

---

[10] Although further initiatives were undertaken by civil society groups, oil companies, and international organizations, evaluation of these efforts is beyond the scope of this chapter. For comprehensive studies of nongovernmental initiatives, see Ibeanu (2006), Ogonor (2003), and Ngomba-Roth (2007).

[11] Beginning in 1975, the (almost exclusively) military governments transferred more and more responsibility from the local and regional levels to the federal level, in order to strengthen Nigeria's internal stability—but also to extend their personal power.

Political Reform Conference.[12] While the delegates from the northern states were willing to accept an increase to 17 percent, the Niger Delta delegates insisted on at least 25 percent, with an eventual increase to 50 percent over the long term. This contentious issue was left unresolved, however, and was not addressed in the closing statement of the conference. The end result was further polarization of oil-producing and non-oil-producing states (UNDP 2006).

The legislative representatives of the Niger Delta—and the vast majority of the Niger Delta population—view the existing regulation as unjustifiably depriving them of revenues that are theirs by right. And for most of the militant groups, a higher share of oil revenues is one of the central official justifications for armed struggle (Olukoya 2009).

The Niger Delta Development Commission

In 2000, faced with growing violence in the delta, the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo made a second effort to address violent conflict by creating the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The NDDC replaced the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), which had been established by the military regime in 1992. As stipulated in the Niger Delta Development Commission Act No. 2, 1999, the NDDC's mandate was to "conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger-Delta area" (Nigerian National Assembly 1999 part II, title 7, 1.b). Specifically, the NDDC was to focus on the "development of social and physical infrastructures; technology; economic/environmental remediation and stability; human development; pursuit of a peaceful environment that allows tourism to thrive and supports a buoyant culture" (UNDP 2006). The NDDC was also charged with developing a long-term master plan for the delta, which would integrate strategies proposed by a variety of stakeholders, including the central and regional governments, oil companies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Guide to Abbreviations

MEND:	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNDA:	Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs
MOSOP:	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDDC:	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDPVF:	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDRDMP:	Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan
OMPADEC:	Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
TCND:	Technical Committee on the Niger Delta

[12] The broader objective of the conference, which was convened by then-president Olusegun Obasanjo, was to discuss future political and constitutional reforms and socioeconomic development in Nigeria, with the ultimate goal of strengthening security, sustainable development, and internal stability. The conference was held between February and July 2005, and was attended by about four hundred participants: six delegates from each state, plus representatives from government-approved social interest groups such as labor unions, business and professional associations, nongovernmental organizations, and ethnic organizations.

By law, the NDDC is an agency of the central government and is directly under the control of the presidency; all commission members are federal political appointees (UNDP 2006). The governing board is made up of nineteen members: the chairman, nine representatives from the oil-producing states, three from the north, and six from the oil and gas industry, federal ministries, and the commission itself (Omeje 2006).[13] Unlike OMPADEC, the new commission draws on various sources—not just on oil revenues—for funding. Most of the funding (between 2001 and 2004, about 78 percent) comes from the federal government (UNDP 2006). Commission members from the oil and gas industry pay 3 percent of their annual budgets toward the support of the NDDC, and member states pay 50 percent of their Ecological Fund allocations (Omeje 2006).[14]

The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP) was developed by GTZ International Services, a German cooperative enterprise for sustainable development that now operates worldwide as GIZ; a Nigerian consulting company; and the NDDC. In March 2007, after an initial delay, President Obasanjo launched the plan. But his successor, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, failed to implement the plan when he became president in May 2007.[15]

The NDRDMP identifies the main social, economic, and environmental problems in the Niger Delta,[16] and provides corresponding policy recommendations designed to achieve sustainable development in the region. The recommendations cover twenty-five sectors, the central ones being infrastructure, health, education, agriculture, and conflict resolution (TCND 2008). The plan is designed to be implemented over a fifteen-year period and assumes a financial investment of US$50 billion (ICG 2007).

The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs and the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta

In September 2008, after repeatedly delaying the implementation of the NDRDMP, President Yar'Adua launched two new initiatives: the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta (TCND). The MNDA's mandate is focused on infrastructure development, environmental protection, and youth empowerment—especially the provision of employment (Roll 2008).

---

[13] The commission consists of the governing board, eleven directorates, the Managing Committee, and the Niger Delta Development Advisory Committee (for further details, see Nigerian National Assembly (1999).

[14] The Ecological Fund was established in 1981 to ameliorate ecological problems; it also finances environmental research.

[15] In February 2010, Vice President Jonathan Goodluck, a former governor of the Niger Delta state Bayelsa, became interim president. In May 2010, President Yar'Adua died, and Goodluck assumed the office of president.

[16] The collection of new demographic and socioeconomic data on the Niger Delta was part of the NDRDMP's mandate.

The MNDA was put in charge of all development efforts in the region (*Africa Research Bulletin* 2009); thus, the NDDC became answerable to the new federal ministry. Initially, the central government announced that the MNDA would be located in the delta—to facilitate coordination with the NDDC and as a signal of the federal government's responsiveness to the wishes of the Niger Delta population. However, the MNDA was ultimately based in Abuja, the national capital. Obong Ufot Ekaette, the new minister of Niger Delta affairs, was born in the delta, but by the time of his appointment, he had already served the federal bureaucracy for many years; hence, his appointment was not very popular in the delta (ICG 2009).

The TCND's mandate was to review all previous reports and initiatives on the Niger Delta—starting with the 1958 Willinks' Report, issued during colonial rule, and including the NDRDMP. On the basis of this review, the TCND was to make recommendations on how "to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region" (TCND 2008, vi). The forty-four-member committee, chaired by Ledum Mitee, the president of MOSOP, submitted its report to the president at the end of 2008. The TCND urged the federal government to initiate a compact with multiple stakeholders confirming its commitment "to support critical short-term changes" (TCND 2008, 59); it also stated that this compact should include, among other things, an immediate increase in the derivation formula to 25 percent (TCND 2008).

In comparison to past efforts to resolve violent conflict and improve socioeconomic conditions in the Niger Delta, the recommendations place greater emphasis on "good governance, transparency and accountability" (TCND 2008, 65) and on "the sustainable utilisation of the resources of the Niger Delta," which "holds the key to the successful reintegration of the Region into a productive national economy" (TCND 2008, 82). In addition, the TCND recommendations focus on economic development and human-capital development, through the improvement of health care and education and the empowerment of women and young people.

OUTCOMES OF THE INITIATIVES

The following evaluation of the peacebuilding initiatives is divided into two complementary parts: the first assesses specific achievements and limitations of the initiatives; the second is a more general analysis of the government's success in achieving its main objectives—namely, reducing violent conflict and improving socioeconomic conditions in the delta. While it is too early for a conclusive evaluation of the latest initiatives (the MNDA and the TCND), a somewhat more definitive assessment of the NDDC—and, with some reservations, of the NDRDMP—is possible.

Achievements and limitations of the initiatives

The mere creation of the NDDC can be considered a breakthrough in the federal government's commitment to the Niger Delta. Both in concept and in terms of

financial support, the NDDC is an improvement over OMPADEC—which, according to several sources, was underfunded, plagued by internal corruption, and failed to achieve any improvement in the development of the region (ANEEJ 2004; Omotola 2007).

According to the NDDC's own reports, by the beginning of 2006 it had initiated over 2,000 development projects and 300 electrification projects (ICG 2006b).[17] However, as Kenneth Omeje (2006) reports, a study published in September 2003 revealed that of 358 projects that had been conceived by the NDDC, only 100 were operational. A 2004 study by the African Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ) supported Omeje's report, finding widespread abandonment of projects in Akwa Ibom State, for example. Although the NDDC has unquestionably made *some* progress in local infrastructure development (ANEEJ 2004; ICG 2006b), the initiative has not had substantial or wide-ranging impact. In short, the NDDC has yet to meet the development needs of the region or the expectations of the populace; as a consequence, delta residents have less and less confidence in the capacity and reliability of the commission.

Explanations of the NDDC's poor performance focus on the lack of funding; numerous sources have reported that neither the federal government, the state government, or the oil companies have met their financial obligations.[18] For instance, a December 2007 report by the International Crisis Group notes that since 2000 the NDDC should have received US$4 billion; instead, it had received US$1.9 billion (ICG 2007). And a November 2008 TCND report "recommends that ALL OUTSTANDING FUNDS due to NDDC be paid IMMEDIATELY as these are legitimate amounts due to the Region"—clearly underlining the serious and persistent financial constraints under which the NDDC operates (TCND 2008, 73).

Another major shortcoming of the NDDC's efforts is the lack of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the allocation and implementation of projects (Omeje 2006). Without monitoring and evaluation, it is impossible to compare project conceptions, the effectiveness of contractors, or empirical outcomes. Moreover, the lack of transparency opens the way for widespread corruption—which, indeed, has been reported to be pervasive in the NDDC (Omotola 2007).

Both in conception and implementation, the NDDC is burdened by a top-down approach: as noted earlier, all the members of the governing board are federal appointees; moreover, there is no mechanism to ensure that members of the local population are included on the commission (Higgins 2008). Programs and projects are thus conceived and designed without the involvement of those who will be most directly affected (Omeje 2006). Understandably, many inhabitants of the delta regard the NDDC as an imposition by the federal government (UNDP 2006); as Ben Aigbokhan (2007, 195) notes, delta residents, "particularly the youth," have a "hostile attitude . . . towards the NDDC."

---

[17] Projects included the construction of roads, schools, health centers, and electrical facilities.

[18] See, for example, ANEEJ (2004); Omeje (2006); and UNDP (2006).

Although the NDRDMP was developed under the aegis of the NDDC, it has several advantages over its parent initiative: first, it is inherently more participatory than both the NDDC itself and the NDDC's earlier projects. For example, the NDRDMP was developed on the basis of broad consultation with Niger Delta residents (Rühl 2004).[19] Second, because of the recognized flaws in the NDDC, the master plan places much more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation (TCND 2008).

Despite being "considered comprehensive by many development experts" (ICG 2009, 11), the NDRDMP has a central flaw, however: it remains essentially unimplemented. The beginnings of the plan date back to late 2001, when GTZ, in collaboration with a Nigerian consulting company and the NDDC, helped to create a broad development plan for the region. The government officially launched the plan in March 2007. Implementation was repeatedly delayed, however, until—as noted earlier—President Yar'Adua launched two new initiatives, the MNDA and the TCND, then gave them mandates that at least partly duplicated the work that had been carried out during the development of the master plan.

Given the history of the NDDC and the NDRDMP, the future of the TCND should also be regarded somewhat skeptically. What speaks in its favor are three factors: (1) its relatively broad membership (as the president of MOSOP, Ledum Mitee, the chair of the TCND, has a great deal of legitimacy in the delta); (2) its participatory character; and (3) its coherent and comprehensive recommendations, which were based on an extensive critical review of former initiatives and development plans (ICG 2009).

Nevertheless, the TCND's report has so far evoked little government response. Instead, in February 2009, several months after receiving the TCND's report, President Yar'Adua announced that he wanted to create yet another government committee to study the TCND's recommendations and propose some strategies for carrying them out (IRIN 2009a). His actions exacerbated the frustration of Niger Delta residents and reinforced their view that the government is unwilling to provide any concrete solutions to the region's problems.

On the one hand, delta residents—many of whom have lost confidence in the NDDC—may view the creation of a completely new agency, the MNDA, as a symbol of a resurgence of the government's commitment to change in the region. On the other hand, the ministry's credibility has been undermined by the decision to locate it in Abuja rather than in the delta, and by the MNDA's "unclear guiding principles" (ICG 2009, 1): unless the ministry's mandate is clarified, its responsibilities and those of the NDDC are likely to overlap (ICG 2009), leading to inefficiency, coordination problems, and the waste of financial resources. Moreover, the ministry's effectiveness may be constrained by low funding. Under the 2009 budget, it was set to receive less funding than the NDDC has received in recent years, making it unlikely that the MNDA will succeed in meeting the

---

[19] Bettina Rühl (2004) reports that consultants undertook extensive qualitative surveys on the current situation, needs, and expectations of Niger Delta residents.

ambitious aims set by the federal government.[20] Among delta residents, views of the new ministry's ability to foster change are mixed; some are doubtful (Walker 2008a), whereas others—including Chief Edwin Clark, a prominent Ijaw leader—are more positive (ICG 2009).

Socioeconomic development and violence in the Niger Delta since 1999

Has the Niger Delta experienced any significant improvement in the principal socioeconomic indicators since 1999? Predominant opinion, both in the literature and among delta residents, is that the government's resource-based initiatives have had little, if any, success (Aigbokhan 2007; Higgins 2009; Omotola 2007). Although current and accurate data are hard to come by, available information appears to support this assessment.[21] For example, according to data from the UN Development Programme, between 1996 and 2004, the incidence of poverty in the Niger Delta decreased somewhat, from 59.0 percent of the population to 50.5 percent—but the poverty level is still above 1980s levels (UNDP 2006).[22] Thus, although there may be a causal relationship between the decline in poverty and the implementation of NDDC programs, the reform of the derivation formula, or both, the decline has not been substantial.

The incidence of poverty is not the sole indicator, however, that socioeconomic conditions have improved little if at all. The Niger Delta is still characterized by poor infrastructure and limited access to health care; in fact, as of 2006, delta residents' access to health care was worse than that of any other region (Aigbokhan 2007). Housing, too, continues to be of poor quality (UNDP 2006). Although there are no reliable data that would allow a comparison between the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, as of 2006, unemployment was extremely high in the Niger Delta, and was higher there than in the rest of the country (Aigbokhan 2007; UNDP 2006).

Finally, oil production in the Niger Delta continues to cause severe environmental damage. So far, despite directives from the central government ordering oil companies to end gas flaring, no substantial reduction has occurred (UNDP 2006; Amnesty International 2009).[23] Oil spills continue to contaminate water resources, destroy farmland, and disperse toxic materials. Indeed, the absolute

---

[20] In fact, as noted earlier, the NDDC did not receive the designated budget at all; it is conceivable that the MNDA might suffer the same fate.

[21] For example, even the TCND's report, which was published in November 2008, relies on a survey published in 2000 for its data on health care access in the delta.

[22] According to the UNDP report, poverty rates in 1980 ranged from a low of 7.2 percent (in Rivers State and Bayelsa State) to a high of 24.9 percent (in Ondo State).

[23] Oil drilling is usually accompanied by escaping gas. In Nigeria, most of the gas is burned as waste; "gas flaring," as it is called, causes air pollution, acid rain, noise, and elevated ambient temperature, grievously harming wildlife, farmland, and human populations.

number of oil spills seems to have increased between 2004 and 2009 (TCND 2008).[24] Referring to general socioeconomic conditions in the Niger Delta, Nnamdi Obasi, head of the ICG's Nigeria bureau, stated in 2009 that "although no recent comprehensive studies have been done on living conditions in the region, residents in several states say the development situation 'has deteriorated' since the 2006 UN Development Programme . . . report on development indicators" (IRIN 2009b).

With respect to the second major objective—ending violent conflict in the delta—empirical results are even more disturbing. Violence (defined as death and displacement) has increased overall since 1999, and at an even more rapid rate since 2003 (Hazen and Horner 2007; HIIK n.d.). One cause of the uptick in violence that began in 1999 was the transition to democracy: politicians began recruiting young men, most of whom were unemployed, and providing them with weapons to intimidate voters and combat political opponents. Since most of the weapons have not been returned (Hazen and Horner 2007; Human Rights Watch 2004), a considerable number of well-armed, disillusioned young men—many of whom were dismissed after the elections, as the politicians no longer had any use for them—are at large, and have become the main actors in the violent uproar raging in the delta (Obi 2006).[25]

In addition to engaging in armed clashes with security forces, militant groups—including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Vigilante, and the now-weakened Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)—have sabotaged oil pipelines, attacked oil installations, and kidnapped staff members. Although the exact number of sabotage attacks is contested, data indicate that the incidence of sabotage has increased considerably since the late 1990s (TCND 2008).[26] Hostage taking is on the rise

---

[24] Not all of the oil spills result from poorly maintained pipelines; some are caused by sabotage, either as an act of protest or for the purpose of theft (Amnesty International 2009).

[25] As of 2011, the most visible armed group is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which has played a prominent role in the region since 2006. Although MEND is largely made up of young Ijaw, it does not make exclusively ethnic demands. MEND's three major demands are the withdrawal of government troops from the Niger Delta; the release from prison of Dokubu Asari, the former leader of an armed group, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF); and local control over oil revenues (Hanson 2007). Some MEND members appear to be former members of the NDPVF, an Ijaw militant group, founded in 2003 by Dokubo Asari, that fractured after Asari was arrested in 2005. In contrast to most of the other militant groups, MEND is said to be a loose coalition of armed groups, lacking a stable internal structure (Hazen and Horner 2007). Also unlike other militant groups, MEND has not specifically called for the delta to secede from the rest of Nigeria (*BBC News* 2006).

[26] Oil companies claim a high incidence of sabotage, for which they blame both militant groups and local communities. Community leaders and representatives of national and international NGOs, however, claim that some of the damage to oil installations results not from sabotage, but from erosion caused by poor maintenance (ICG 2006a).

as well (ICG 2006a), with 167 kidnappings in 2007 alone (ICG 2009). While the victims are mainly foreign oil workers, a growing number of wealthy Nigerians have also been taken hostage. In addition to drawing public attention to militant demands, hostage taking is used to finance militant activities.[27]

According to IRIN (2009b), the UN news agency, 2008 was "the Delta's most dangerous year on record"; in the first nine months of the year, 1,000 people were killed and 300 were taken hostage. Because of intensified military operations under way since May 2009, clashes between government forces and militant groups have increased; the resulting waves of displacement have affected thousands of people.

In August 2009, the government offered amnesty to all militants who hand over their arms; those who renounce violence will receive financial compensation and be given access to rehabilitation programs. Although some militant groups, including MEND, initially resisted participation, many relented shortly before the deadline: ultimately, at least 8,000 militants are reported to have joined the amnesty program, and thousands of guns were collected (Vanguard 2009). Although the amnesty is only a first step, there are signs that, at least in the short term, federal funds will be used for rehabilitation programs for former militants. Nevertheless, given the unsolved socioeconomic crisis in the delta, the remaining weapons arsenals, and the failure of similar amnesty programs in the past, some observers remain skeptical about the long-term success of the amnesty (*BBC News* 2009; Duffield 2009).

CONSTRAINTS ON OUTCOMES

The Nigerian government's efforts to support peacebuilding in the Niger Delta through resource management suffer from three major constraints, two of which are conceptual and the third of which is structural:

- Especially during the first years after the transition to democracy, program planning occurred without sufficient public participation.
- Implemented projects are not subject to adequate external monitoring or self-evaluation.
- The oil industry is capital intensive, but it is not labor intensive (Karl 2007). This structural problem is particularly pronounced in Nigeria, where virtually no oil is processed within the country; instead, it is generally exported immediately. As a result, the oil industry provides very few jobs in Nigeria; it thereby contributes directly to the extremely high unemployment in the delta, and indirectly to conflict in the region. This issue has not been addressed sufficiently

[27] In addition, criminal copycats engage in hostage taking simply to make money (Hazen and Horner 2007).

within the conception of the initiatives so far, at least not in a sustainable and structural manner.[28]

These conceptual and structural problems are not the only constraints on the government initiatives, however. Broader contextual constraints—both political and social—also impede the effectiveness of the initiatives. First and foremost is the persistent weakness of Nigeria's political institutions (Lewis 2007), which are characterized by lack of transparency, corruption, patronage, and the absence of democratic leadership (especially, but not exclusively, at the state and local levels) (Ologbenla 2007; Higgins 2009). The authors of a 2009 report published by Control Risks, found, for example, that despite "limited progress, . . . coping with corruption remained a major challenge" (Gosztonyi, Taylor, and Bray 2009, 5). Thus, money allocated for socioeconomic development is often used by state and local politicians for private gain (Omeje 2006)—which helps to explain why, despite significant increases in revenues resulting from the reform of the derivation formula, many of the funds are not reaching the local population.

More broadly, the weakness of political institutions generally undermines the effectiveness of *all* government initiatives—including efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions and resolve conflict (Bergstresser 2007). The NDDC's lack of funding and the postponed implementation of the NDRDMP and of the recommendations of the TCND cannot be traced solely to the weakness of political institutions, however: the more immediate causes are lack of government commitment and insufficient opportunities for members of the political opposition, or for civil society groups, to pressure both the government and the oil companies to increase their financial accountability.

Another contextual constraint is the relative weakness and fragmentation of civil society (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007)—the legacy of extreme ethnic diversity and decades of repressive military rule. Civil society groups are central to peacebuilding; where they are weak and fragmented, development is inevitably hampered.

A number of geographic and demographic characteristics also complicate peacebuilding efforts. The Niger Delta is rough territory, composed largely of marshland and forest and crossed by an extensive network of creeks. As a consequence, it is extremely difficult to provide sustainable infrastructure to the region, and the area provides an excellent hiding place for militant groups. The population density in the habitable parts of the Niger Delta is very high (UNDP 2006) and constantly on the rise; population pressure has rendered land scarce and complicated local development efforts, especially job-creation programs. Moreover, because of Nigeria's large population, per capita oil revenues are low in comparison to those of other oil-producing countries. In 2008, for example, when oil prices were high, per capita oil revenue in Nigeria was only US$409

---

[28] Nigeria engages in almost no oil processing; in fact, almost all of Nigeria's refined oil products are imported (EIA 2009). Although there are four existing state-owned refineries, their capacity is very low, and Nigeria has no private petroleum refineries.

(about US$1.10 per day), versus US$8,291 in Saudi Arabia (EIA 2009). Thus, even if oil wealth were distributed equally, the extent to which peace could be "bought" (or sustainable economic development promoted) would still be limited (Basedau and Lay 2009).[29]

Finally, there is one more crucial contextual factor, which is an indirect consequence of the enduring weakness of political institutions: powerful actors profit, directly or indirectly, from the violent conflict and are fostering its continuation. Since 2000, Nigeria has been home to a thriving trade in weapons and stolen oil that is supported by numerous entities: militant groups; members of the national security forces (Amnesty International 2005; ICG 2006a);[30] politicians (especially at the local and federal levels); the so-called godfathers (wealthy and powerful individuals);[31] and international businesses (both legitimate and less so) (Hanson 2007; Hazen and Horner 2007; Marquardt 2007). Illegal oil trading has increased since 2000 (UNODC 2009). According to the ICG (2006a, i), various industry experts have estimated that "Nigeria loses anywhere from 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day to illegal bunkering," which is equivalent to between 3 and 12 percent of the country's total oil production. By providing militant groups with weapons and financial resources, the illegal oil trade has fueled an autonomous economy of violence.

LESSONS LEARNED

Since 1999, Nigeria's democratic governments have launched a number of efforts to reduce violence and improve socioeconomic conditions in the Niger Delta; as this chapter has demonstrated, these initiatives have had little success so far. The failure of the initiatives derives, in part, from conceptual problems inherent in their design—namely, a lack of participation and a lack of monitoring and evaluation. However, the Nigerian government seems to have learned some lessons from past experience: more recent initiatives—the NDRDMP and the TCND—are, at least theoretically, more participatory, and have included civil society groups in their planning efforts. Although the NDRDMP also stresses the importance of monitoring projects, self-evaluation is still lagging in practice, and will remain an important future challenge.

---

[29] For a further exploration of this point, see Basedau and Lay (2009), which argues that per capita resource wealth, despite having been largely neglected by previous studies, is pivotal: petrostates with low per capita resource wealth tend to be prone to violence, whereas those with high per capita resource wealth tend to have little violence. Oil-wealthy countries manage to maintain stability through large-scale distribution of wealth, high spending on the security apparatus, and the assurance of protection from external allies (for instance, oil-importing countries that have an interest in protecting cooperative governments).

[30] There are allegations of particular involvement by the Nigerian navy (ICG 2006a).

[31] Godfathers exert crucial political influence in Nigeria: in return for their support for political candidates (which often involves violence), they demand personal benefits, control of political decisions, and shielding from the consequences of their illegal activities, including oil theft (Walker 2008b).

Moreover, the government has so far failed to develop a comprehensive strategy for addressing the economic distortions caused by the oil industry, especially with respect to creating sustainable employment opportunities. Any long-term solution must entail both capacity-building programs and an effort to strengthen the processing industry (and related industries) throughout the country.[32]

As discussed in the previous section, the federal initiatives have also been constrained by broad contextual issues—principally, the weakness of Nigeria's political institutions. Although the federal government appears to have become increasingly aware of the consequence of this weakness—and has, for example, intensified anticorruption initiatives—both political capacity and political will, especially at the state and local levels, are still lacking.[33] More comprehensive approaches are also needed to address oil theft and weapons trading, both of which perpetuate violent struggle. Finally, because local infrastructure has been repeatedly and seriously damaged during military raids, the excessive violence associated with military action in the Niger Delta (Amnesty International 2005; ICG 2006c) has constrained and counteracted the few development efforts that have been achieved so far. Perhaps even more important, military suppression is gradually destroying the government's credibility and indirectly creating support (either active or passive) for militant groups.

CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS

It is impossible, within this brief chapter, to provide a complete set of recommendations for successful peacebuilding through resource management in the Niger Delta, but some further insights that may be of help are offered here.

First, in the short term, the vicious cycle of violence—and the associated reinforcement of socioeconomic grievances—was broken, in August 2009, by an amnesty program for all militants who hand over their weapons. As of this writing, 8,000 militants had reportedly accepted the amnesty offer, many more than were initially expected. This is a window of opportunity that should be seized to immediately satisfy some of the basic needs of the local population. Such a step could prevent further frustration among the residents of the Niger Delta—frustration that would otherwise foster active or passive support for armed struggle and facilitate continued recruitment of young militants. Oil revenues could be used to create special funds to finance rehabilitation programs for former militants, as well as basic improvements in physical and social infrastructure.

In the medium term, comprehensive reforms that take into consideration the "lessons learned" are absolutely indispensable. Thus, the federal government should

---

[32] Capacity-building efforts should include infrastructure development, the improvement of both general and specialized education, and enhancement of local and regional administrative expertise.

[33] This is evident in the conception of the NDRDMP, for example, and in the creation of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in 2002.

give much greater priority to the weaknesses of Nigeria's political institutions and should strive to eliminate support for corruption and patronage. Although Nigeria's participation, since 2004, in the international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—which calls for action not only on the part of the Nigerian government, but also on the part of the oil companies—is a move in the right direction, it must be accompanied by comprehensive reforms of the political system and the political culture.[34] An important first step would be the creation of internal control mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability for state governments, with respect to both revenues and expenditures.

Furthermore, the excessive violence associated with the government's military action in the Niger Delta must be contained. This does not necessarily mean that security forces should be completely withdrawn (which would be unrealistic), but military action and the excessive use of force must be restricted. Efforts should also be made to eliminate the sometimes rapacious culture that is associated with the security forces and the police. Here, the first step should be fundamental reform focused on improving education and ensuring adequate compensation.

Efforts to combat oil theft and weapons trading must not only strengthen internal transparency and control mechanisms, but must also accord greater emphasis to the international aspects of the problem, which have been largely neglected. At the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States could play a much more important role, by helping to eradicate cross-border trafficking in weapons and oil. As the problem also has global dimensions, which cannot be solved solely by the governments of West Africa, international efforts have to be strengthened as well. For instance, oil-importing countries must be held more responsible for even passive involvement in trafficking, and international oil-trade channels must be made more transparent.

The Nigerian government's resource-based peacebuilding initiatives have failed to address the complex issues underlying the violent conflicts. To succeed, the initiatives must be integrated into comprehensive policies that speak to those underlying issues. In the long term, the only sustainable approach to resource management will be to reduce Nigeria's excessive dependence on oil exports and to aggressively develop alternative economic engines throughout the country.

REFERENCES

Africa Research Bulletin. 2009. Nigeria: Oil facilities targeted. *Africa Research Bulletin* 46 (6): 18010B–18012B.

---

[34] Under the EITI, the Nigerian government committed to providing detailed, publicly accessible information about oil- and gas-company revenues; the oil and gas companies must also disclose payments made to the Nigerian government. Thus, not only is the Nigerian government under pressure to make transparent and accountable use of the revenues, but the oil companies are also under greater scrutiny, and therefore less able to engage in corruption or bribery.

Aigbokhan, B. E. 2007. Reconstruction of economic governance in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria: The case of the Niger Delta Development Commission. In *Reconstructing economic governance after conflict in resource-rich African countries*, ed. K. Wohlmuth and T. Urban. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Amnesty International. 2005. *Ten years on: Injustice and violence haunt the oil delta*. www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/022/2005/en/63b716d6-d49d-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/afr440222005en.pdf.

———. 2009. *2009*: *Nigeria, petroleum, pollution and poverty in the Niger Delta*. www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8-a73c-a7a4766ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf.

ANEEJ (African Network for Environment and Economic Justice). 2004. Oil of poverty in Niger Delta. www.aneej.org/Documents/OIL%20OF%20POVERTY%201.pdf.

Basedau, M., and J. Lay. 2009. Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambiguous effects of oil wealth and oil dependence on violent conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 46: 757–776.

BBC News. 2006. Nigeria's shadowy oil rebels. April 20. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4732210.stm.

———. 2009. Nigerian militant amnesty starts. August 6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8186816.stm.

Bergstresser, H. 1998. Nigeria 1997. In *Afrika-Jahrbuch 1997: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Afrika südlich der Sahara*, ed. R. Hofmeier. Opladen, Germany: Leske und Budrich.

———. 2007. Polit-ökonomische Kurzanalyse Nigeria. Unpublished report. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2007. *BTI 2008—Nigeria country report*. Gütersloh, Germany.

Duffield, C. 2009. Will amnesty bring peace to the Niger Delta? *BBC News*, October 5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8291336.stm.

EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration). 2009. Country analysis briefs: Nigeria. www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Nigeria/Oil.html.

Gosztonyi, K., A. Taylor, and J. Bray. 2009. Facing up to corruption in Nigeria. www.crg.com/PDF/nigeria_corruption_2009_final.pdf.

Hanson, S. 2007. MEND: The Niger Delta's umbrella militant group. March 22. www.cfr.org/publication/12920/.

Harneit-Sievers, A. 1992. Kriegsfolgen und kriegsbewältigung in Afrika: Der nigerianische bürgerkrieg, 1967–70. Unpublished report.

Hazen, J. M., and J. Horner. 2007. Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in perspective. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20. www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/o_papers_pdf/2007-op20-Nigeria.pdf.

Higgins, K. 2009. Regional inequality and the Niger Delta. Policy Brief No. 5. Overseas Development Institute. www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2507.pdf.

HIIK (Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung). n.d. Conflict barometer. http://hiik.de/de/konfliktbarometer/index.html.

Human Rights Watch. 1995. The Ogoni crisis: A case-study of military repression in southeastern Nigeria. www.hrw.org/en/reports/1995/07/01/ogoni-crisis.

———. 1999. The price of oil: Corporate responsibility and human rights violations in Nigeria's oil producing communities. www.hrw.org/en/reports/1999/02/23/price-oil.

———. 2002. The Niger Delta: No democratic dividend. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2002/10/22/niger-delta.

———. 2003. The Warri crisis: Fueling violence. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/17/warri-crisis.

———. 2004. Nigeria's 2003 elections: The unacknowledged violence. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2004/06/01/nigeria-s-2003-elections-0.

———. 2007. Chop fine: The human rights impact of local government corruption and mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/01/30/chop-fine.

Ibeanu, O. 2006. *Civil society and conflict management in the Niger Delta*. Monograph series 2. Lagos, Nigeria: Cleen Foundation.

Ibeanu, O., and F. K. Mohammed, eds. 2001. *Oiling violence: The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Niger Delta*. Lagos, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

ICG (International Crisis Group). 2006a. Fuelling the Niger Delta crisis. *Africa Report* 118 (September 28). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=4394.

———. 2006b. Nigeria's faltering federal experiment. *Africa Report* 119 (October 25). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=4464.

———. 2006c. Want in the midst of plenty. *Africa Report* 113 (July 19). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4274.

———. 2007. Nigeria: Ending unrest in the Niger Delta. *Africa Report* 135 (December 5). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5186&l=1.

———. 2009. Seizing the moment in the Niger Delta. *Africa Briefing* 60 (April 30). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=6080.

IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2009a. Nigeria: Timeline of recent events in Niger Delta. *IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis,* May 28. www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=84606.

———. 2009b. Nigeria: Violence creates "human security" crisis in Delta. *IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis*, May 13. www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=84371.

Karl, T. L. 2007. Oil-led development: Social, political and economic consequences. CDDRL Working Papers 80: 1–34. http://iis-b.stanford.edu/pubs/21537/No_80_Terry_Karl_Effects_of_Oil_Development.pdf.

Le Billon, P. 2008. Resources for peace? Managing revenues from extractive industries in post-conflict environments. Public finance in post-conflict environments: A policy paper series. February. New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation. www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/CIC_paper5_LeBillon_FINAL.pdf.

Lewis, P. M. 2007. *Growing apart: Oil, politics, and economic change in Indonesia and Nigeria*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lubeck, P., M. Watts, and R. Lipschutz. 2007. *Convergent interests: U.S. energy security and the "securing" of Nigerian democracy*. CIP International Policy Reports. February. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy. http://ciponline.org/NIGERIA_FINAL.pdf.

Mähler, A. 2010. Nigeria: A prime example of the resource curse? Revisiting the oil-violence link in the Niger Delta. German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers 120.

Marquardt, E. 2007. Mujahid Dokubo-Asari: The Niger Delta's Ijaw leader. *Terrorism Monitor* 5 (15): 1–4.

Ngomba-Roth, R. 2007. *Multinational companies and conflicts in Africa: The case of the Niger Delta—Nigeria*. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag.

Nigerian National Assembly. 1999. Niger Delta Development Commission Act No. 2, 1999. Abuja.

Obi, C. 2001. Oil minority rights versus the Nigerian state: Conflict and transcendence. University of Leipzig Papers on Africa. Politics and Economics Series 53.

———. 2006. Youth and the generational dimensions to struggles for resource control in the Niger Delta. CODESRIA Monograph Series. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/Cyril_Obi.pdf.

Ogonor, B. O. 2003. The impact of training on the conflict resolution ability of rural women in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 22 (2): 172–181.

Ologbenla, D. K. 2007. Leadership, governance and corruption in Nigeria. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 9 (3): 97–118.

Olukoya, S. 2009. The Niger Delta and violence. Unpublished study.

Omeje, K. 2006. *High stakes and stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Omotola, J. S. 2007. From the OMPADEC to the NDDC: An assessment of state responses to environmental insecurity in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Africa Today* 54 (1): 73–89.

Oyefusi, A. 2007. Oil and the propensity to armed struggle in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4194. http://ssrn.com/abstract=979666.

Roll, M. 2008. "Baba Go-slow." Hintergrundinformationen aus der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Afrika, September 30. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/05766.pdf.

Rühl, B. 2004. Masterplan im Niger Delta. Akzente 1. www2.gtz.de/dokumente/akz/deu/AKZ_2004_1/Nigeria_Nigerdelta.pdf.

Sala-i-Martin, X., and A. Subramanian. 2003. Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria. IMF Working Paper 03/139. http://ssrn.com/abstract=420318.

TCND (Technical Committee on the Niger Delta). 2008. Report of the technical committee on the Niger Delta. www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/uploads/Other%20publications/Nigeriareport.pdf.

Ukeje, C., ed. 2003. *Oil and violent conflicts in the Niger Delta*. Ile-Ife, Nigeria: Centre for Development and Conflict Management Studies.

UN Comtrade (United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database). n.d. UN Statistics Division. http://comtrade.un.org/db.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2006. *Niger Delta human development report*. Abuja, Nigeria.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 2009. *From conflict to peacebuilding. The role of natural resources and the environment*. Policy Paper 1. Nairobi.

UDODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2009. Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa: a threat assessment. Vienna.

Vanguard. 2009. Amnesty: FG to destroy recovered weapons. October 11. www.vanguardngr.com/2009/10/11/amnesty-fg-to-destroy-recovered-weapons/.

Walker, A. 2008a. Doubts over Niger Delta ministry. *BBC News*, September 11. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7609904.stm.

———. 2008b. "Blood oil" dripping from Nigeria. *BBC News,* July 27. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7519302.stm.

World Bank. 2003. Nigeria strategic conflict assessment. *Social Development Notes* 11 (May 2003). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111751313696/20480272/SDN83CPR11.pdf.

Zinn, A. 2005. Theory versus reality: Civil war onset and avoidance in Nigeria since 1960. In *Understanding civil war: Evidence and analysis*, *Volume 1—Africa,* ed. P. Collier and N. Sambanis. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.