




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Stopping the Plunder of Natural Resources to Provide for a Sustainable Peace in Côte d'Ivoire

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Stopping the plunder of natural resources to provide for a sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire

Koffi K. Michel Yoboué

Côte d'Ivoire is endowed with oil, gas, and diamonds; its cocoa export industry is the largest in the world, and its coffee export industry is the thirteenth-largest (ICCO 2012; ICO n.d.). The uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources has played a pivotal role in funding and perpetuating the conflict that has plagued Côte d'Ivoire. Both sides of the conflict have illegally used natural resources to their advantage (UNSC 2009), while the country as a whole has become increasingly impoverished. Illegal exploitation has impeded economic development and provided incentives for peace spoilers, undermining efforts to build a sustainable peace. Opportunities for reform are emerging, however, from the change in leadership and from burgeoning efforts on the part of domestic and international civil society groups.

This chapter is divided into eight sections: (1) historical background on the Côte d'Ivoire conflict and its aftermath; (2) economic background on Côte d'Ivoire; (3) a discussion of corruption in the natural resource sectors; (4) a consideration of rebel groups' exploitation of natural resources during the conflict; (5) an analysis of the role of natural resources in the 2010–2011 election conflict; (6) a description of reform efforts undertaken by the government and civil society; (7) a consideration of developments under the new administration; and (8) a brief conclusion.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The “lighthouse of Africa” began to flicker in the late 1990s, as the citizens of Côte d'Ivoire became increasingly disenchanted with Henri Konan Bédié, the hand-picked successor of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the Ivoirian statesman who had led the country to independence in 1960. Not only had Bédié's rule become increasingly oppressive, but he was also leading the country into an economic downturn.

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In December 1999, frustration culminated in a military coup d'état, ending thirty-nine years of peace. The population saw the removal of Bédié as an opening for true democracy, and was euphoric about the shift in power. The military installed General Robert Guéï as interim president. In the elections held in October 2000, the only candidates were Guéï and Laurent Gbagbo, a longtime opposition candidate. Ousted president Bédié was in exile in France, and another candidate, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, preferred by many from the Muslim north, was prohibited from running because of accusations that he did not meet nationality requirements (BBC News 2014a).

Guéï claimed victory but was chased from power by a popular uprising, which was sparked by a belief that he had engaged in ballot rigging. Ultimately, the murky election process returned the government to civilian rule, with Laurent Gbagbo as president. But the violent conflict that had begun in 1999, with the first coup, could not be banished. Within the year, there was a second, failed coup attempt—which, by September 2002, had become a rebellion. The country was divided in two: the north was controlled by a rebel group, the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire, or MPCl), and the south was controlled by Gbagbo. When Guéï was killed in street protests, only Ouattara was left to oppose Gbagbo. Fighting and looting in the north and west led the populations of those regions to flee: some left the country, but many migrated to the south—particularly to metropolitan Abidjan—in search of safety and economic opportunity (BBC News 2002a, 2002b).

In 2002, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convened a special session in Accra, Ghana, to seek a solution to the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire (UNDDR Resource Centre n.d.). This summit led to a ceasefire between the government and the MPCl on October 17, 2002. Hostilities were suspended, and French military forces were deployed to monitor the ceasefire line. The peace was short-lived, however; by November, two new rebel groups had joined the MPCl, which then became known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire (FN) (Balint-Kurti 2007).

Hostilities mounted, and in March 2004, United Nations peacekeeping forces were deployed. Elections that were to have been held in 2005 were repeatedly postponed, while several peace agreements were signed and abandoned. Most notably, as a result of the Ouagadougou Agreement, signed in 2007, rebel leader Guillaume Soro became prime minister (BBC News 2014c).¹ For a brief time, the Ouagadougou Agreement also advanced the reunification process, restored the free circulation of goods and people, and allowed internally displaced persons to return home.

When the long-delayed presidential election finally occurred, in October 2010, it proceeded according to negotiated procedures and standards, and a

¹ Before becoming prime minister, Soro was the secretary-general of the FN and had principal responsibility for the political branch of the rebellion.



significant international presence monitored compliance. In the first electoral round, no candidate could secure the absolute majority needed: incumbent president Gbagbo gained 38 percent of the vote, while Ouattara and former president Bédié received 32 percent and 25 percent, respectively. The ensuing runoff vote between Gbagbo and Ouattara resulted in an apparently decisive victory for Ouattara, who garnered 54.1 percent of the vote, versus 45.9 percent for Gbagbo (votes were cast largely along north-south lines) (Cook 2011). Pursuant to the UN-certified electoral process, by which Gbagbo had agreed to abide in 2007, the electoral commission formally proclaimed Ouattara the winner (UN News Centre 2010). However, Gbagbo contested the election and transferred the responsibility of determining and declaring the results from the election commission to the Constitutional Council. Since most members of the council had been nominated by Gbagbo or his supporters, the council’s decision to annul the votes from seven northern regions—and thereby shift the votes in favor of Gbagbo—was hardly a surprise.

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Both Ouattara and Gbagbo claimed victory, held inaugurations, and appointed cabinets. The international community was quick to recognize Ouattara as the legitimately elected president and to reject Gbagbo's claim to power. Both ECOWAS and the African Union suspended Côte d'Ivoire's membership, pending Ouattara's assumption of power. Nevertheless, Gbagbo maintained control over several sectors of government, primarily the military and police forces (Cook 2011). In early April 2011, after months of clashes, the FN (by then known as the Forces Républicaines), which supported Ouattara, captured Gbagbo (BBC News 2014a)—and in May 2011, Ouattara was officially sworn in as president (Aljazeera 2011c). In July 2013, Ouattara announced that he would seek a second term in the presidential elections set for 2015 (VOA 2013). As of July 2014, Gbagbo is in custody and faces trial before the International Criminal Court on four counts of crimes against humanity associated with the 2010–2011 post-electoral violence (ICC n.d.; BBC News 2014b).

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Since the 1999 coup, continuous instability has led to a severe decline in Ivoirian quality of life. The displacement of significant portions of the population has increased vulnerability, and many basic needs go unmet: for example, as of 2011, only 68 percent of the rural population had access to an improved water source (World Bank 2013). The slowdown of economic activity has led to skyrocketing unemployment and exacerbated the social impacts of political instability, particularly for the most vulnerable segments of the population. As of 2006, 17 percent of Ivoirian children under five years of age were underweight (UNICEF 2012); and as of 2008, approximately 24 percent of the population was living on US\$1.25 a day (World Bank n.d.).²

Nevertheless, Côte d'Ivoire remains the economic leader of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, or UEMOA); and among ECOWAS members, it has 40 percent of all monetary resources and the second-strongest economy (BICC 2009; ECOSTAT n.d.). And despite its economic and political crises, Côte d'Ivoire has successfully transitioned from an agricultural economy to one based on mining and petroleum resources. In 2009, petroleum revenues were nearly equal to the combined revenues from coffee and cocoa, which have historically been the base of the country's economy (BICC 2009).³ During the country's protracted conflict, both sides relied on Côte d'Ivoire's natural resource wealth for support; in the transition from conflict to peace, natural resource wealth represents the nation's principal source of hope.

² The figure of US\$1.25 a day is based on "the percentage of the population living on less than \$1.25 a day at 2005 international prices" (World Bank n.d.).

³ In 2008, according to official government figures, Côte d'Ivoire produced roughly 50,000 barrels of oil per day (BICC 2009).

CORRUPTION IN NATURAL RESOURCE SECTORS UNDER THE GBAGBO ADMINISTRATION

For more than a decade, the nepotism, corruption, lack of transparency, and financial mismanagement of the Gbagbo administration (October 2000–April 2011) further impoverished the country, depriving its people of opportunities for economic growth and social stability.

Nepotism

Gbagbo assigned his relatives and close friends strategic positions in the natural resource sectors, particularly in the oil industry. For instance, as the chief executive officer (CEO) of Puma Energy (the principal trader of the country's oil stocks, and the local subsidiary of the Dutch commodity-trading company Trafigura), Gbagbo named someone from his hometown. At the state oil company, Société Nationale d'Opérations Pétrolières de la Côte d'Ivoire (PETROCI), the CEO was Gbagbo's brother-in-law. And at the state refining company, Société Ivoirienne de Raffinage (SIR), Gbagbo's uncle was the president of the board of directors. The storage and distribution of petroleum by the state oil investment company, Société de Gestion des Stocks Pétroliers de Côte d'Ivoire (GESTOCI), was managed by a longtime associate of Gbagbo's, who was later appointed minister of technical training and professional education. In the private sector, the Kuyo Pipeline Corporation, which was directed by one of Gbagbo's cousins, was the happy beneficiary of all of PETROCI's business.

Nepotism was rampant in the cocoa industry as well: the executive director of the Fund for Regulation and Control (Fonds de Régulation et de Contrôle, or FRC), the agency responsible for regulating the coffee and cocoa industries, had been Gbagbo's election campaign director. The chair of the FRC and the director of the Coffee and Cocoa Cooperatives Guarantee Fund (Fonds de Garantie des Coopératives Café et Cacao, or FGCC) were political appointees, both assigned their roles by members of Gbagbo's cabinet. While none of this was technically illegal, it set the stage for the opaque management of the cocoa industry.⁴

The opportunity presented by this carefully established opacity was fully exploited. After initial communications, the finance and agriculture ministries consistently failed to respond to UN inquiries about the management of natural resource revenues; as a result, the UN was unable to obtain crucial information linking defense spending to government revenues from natural resources (UNSC 2008). The vast majority of oil, gas, and cocoa companies were similarly unresponsive, further hindering the UN's investigations.

⁴For further details on nepotism in Côte d'Ivoire's cocoa industry, see Global Witness (2007).

Corruption

The most flagrant example of corruption during Gbagbo's regime was the clandestine dumping of foreign toxic waste in residential Abidjan. One night in August 2006, 500 tons of petrochemical waste mysteriously appeared in various locations in Abidjan. The waste had arrived at the port of Abidjan in the hold of the *Probo Koala*, a Greek oil tanker chartered by Trafigura, after the Netherlands had refused to accept it because of its toxicity. Dumping of this type is explicitly prohibited by the Basel Convention as well as by the Bamako Convention.⁵ The hazardous waste—which was deposited in a poor, densely populated area—caused at least fifteen deaths and prompted thousands to seek medical attention (UN News Centre 2009).

In February 2007, the Gbagbo administration accepted Trafigura's offer of US\$198 million in exchange for an absolute waiver of liability (UNHRC 2009). In further violation of the victims' legal, social, and economic rights, the agreement also foreclosed any attempts to fully assess damages, including harm to human health. Eventually, a possible explanation for the government's hasty action surfaced: an investigation revealed that a company called Tommy, which was dissolved shortly thereafter, had carried the waste from the *Probo Koala* into Abidjan; among Tommy's owners were Gbagbo's wife, Simone, and Marcel Gossio, the administrator of the port (BICC 2009).

Despite the efforts of the Gbagbo administration to circumvent liability issues, several legal actions did proceed. In 2006, approximately 30,000 Ivorian citizens who had been injured by exposure to the waste brought claims to the High Court of Justice, in London. Three years later, the court awarded approximately US\$1,500 to each of the claimants; compensation was distributed in March 2010 (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre 2011). In September 2009, the UN Human Rights Council published a report by the Special Rapporteur, who had visited Côte d'Ivoire in August 2008, on the adverse effects of the illicit transport and dumping of toxic and dangerous substances (UNHRC 2009). According to the report, there was "strong prima facie evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences [were] related to the dumping of the waste from the *Probo Koala*" (UNHRC 2009, 10). Subsequently, the Dutch government subjected Trafigura to criminal prosecution. In July 2010, the Amsterdam Court levied a fine of 11 million and found both the captain of the

⁵ The Basel Convention, adopted on March 22, 1989, is formally titled the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. For the full text of the Basel Convention, see www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf.

The Bamako Convention, adopted on January 30, 1991, is formally titled the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa. For the full text of the Bamako Convention, see www.africa-union.org/root/au/documents/treaties/Text/hazardouswastes.pdf.

ship and a Trafigura employee based in Amsterdam criminally liable for illegally exporting toxic waste (BBC News 2010). In January 2012, the Dutch public prosecutor's office filed legal action against Claude Dauphin, chairman and chief executive officer of Trafigura, for the company's alleged illegal exportation of waste. The case settled out of court.⁶

Lack of transparency and financial mismanagement

Lack of transparency and financial mismanagement also wreaked havoc on the cocoa industry, which had historically been (along with coffee) the base of Côte d'Ivoire's economy. Taxes paid by the cocoa industry were officially accounted for in the government budget. But in 2000 and 2001, Gbagbo established para-governmental agencies that were responsible for managing certain aspects of the national cocoa industry, including financial regulation. In other words, Gbagbo partially transferred management of the cocoa industry to shadow agencies that were outside the government structure and hidden from view. These agencies levied additional taxes on the cocoa industry, collecting tremendous sums that were then used, directly and indirectly, to contribute to Gbagbo's defense efforts. One such agency was found to have purchased a number of trucks identical to those used in Gbagbo's military operations (UNSC 2009). Control of the riches from the cocoa industry also enabled Gbagbo to persist in power long after he had any legal right to do so.

THE REBELS' EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Although they were viewed by many Ivoirian citizens as freedom fighters who were struggling to establish democracy and oust an oppressive, divisive, and illegitimate leader, the FN lacked a formal, coherent military structure and failed to consistently obey laws or standards for military conduct. Although the FN's leaders had received some training, many of its soldiers were recruited directly from the towns and villages of the north, as the rebellion grew.⁷ And, like Gbagbo, the rebels relied on natural resource revenues to support their efforts.

The cocoa trade

After the 2002 ceasefire agreement signed in Lomé, Togo, left nearly 60 percent of the country under rebel control, the rebel leaders lived like warlords, exploiting natural resources and using the revenues—most notably from cocoa—to fund

⁶Trafigura paid 1300,000 (at the time, approximately US\$400,000) in compensation and 167,000 (approximately US\$90,000) in fines to have the case against Dauphin withdrawn (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre n.d.).

⁷Some observers have suggested that the rebels' ranks also included mercenaries from other conflicts in West Africa (Panapress 2011; Schmall and Azango 2011).

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their operations. The territory controlled by the FN produced an estimated 128,000 tons of cocoa during the 2006–2007 season, enough to place the north of Côte d’Ivoire among the largest cocoa producers worldwide (UNSC 2009). In 2005, rebel leader Guillaume Soro admitted that the FN was rerouting cocoa shipments to prevent Gbagbo from benefiting from them, and was also taxing the cocoa trade and using the funds to support the rebellion:

I took the decision that cocoa should not go to the ports of San Pedro and Abidjan because we are in a war situation. It is not for us to send it down to Abidjan and give (President Laurent) Gbagbo the means to buy weapons to fight us. That would be stupid. That is why we decided the cocoa should go up and leave through other ports—Guinea, Togo, and Ghana. We have set up a tax system and this money is used for the rebellion (UNSC 2006, 9).

One study concluded that up to 75 percent of the cocoa produced in rebel-controlled areas was being smuggled out of Côte d’Ivoire via trade routes managed by the FN, and was possibly being sold as Ghanaian cocoa (UNSC 2009). Cocoa exporters opted to use these trade routes because the rates paid by the rebels were more favorable than those paid by the government.

Although the details of the FN’s finances have not been made public, indications are that the rebels’ business ventures were extremely profitable. Some estimates suggest that they may have brought in as much as US\$130 million a year, including up to US\$32 million from the illegal taxation of cocoa exports. Although the FN claimed to provide “security services” in exchange for protection fees, it does not appear to have provided either services or supplies to the populations in the north of Côte d’Ivoire; instead, the FN used natural resource revenues almost exclusively to fund its own operations (UNSC 2008).

The diamond and gold trade

As of 1999, Côte d’Ivoire exported approximately 400,000 carats of diamonds per year.⁸ Beginning early in the politico-military crisis, all formal government control, supervision, and management of the diamond sector ceased (BICC 2008). Because the FN controlled the north, it also controlled the diamondiferous region, and used its control to achieve further economic gain through illicit diamond trading.

On November 19, 2002, in an effort to prevent diamond profits from being used to buy arms, the minister of mines and energy under the Gbagbo administration issued Ministerial Decree No. 0070/MME/DM, which prohibited the export of Ivoirian diamonds. The following year, Côte d’Ivoire became one of the founding members of the Kimberley Process, a joint effort on the part of governments, industry, and civil society to stem the flow of “conflict diamonds”—

⁸ A portion of the exported diamonds originated in Sierra Leone (BICC 2008).

that is, diamonds that are used to fund military action against legitimate governments.⁹ Nevertheless, the mismanagement of the diamond sector and the use of diamond revenues to fund conflict, in which both sides engaged during the early 2000s, eventually attracted international attention. In 2005, through Resolution 1643, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) required member states to halt all imports of Ivoirian rough diamonds (BICC 2009).

Similar practices were also uncovered in the gold sector. In its 2009 report, the UN Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire noted that “[c]ertain elements within the Forces nouvelles [*sic*] are also heavily involved in the taxation of natural resources. Goldmining is one such activity, with apparently lucrative returns” (UNSC 2009, 49). The group found that Randgold Resources, for example, had paid Martin Kouakou Fofié, the commander of one of the rebel zones and one of three FN leaders who had been sanctioned by the UN, at least US\$6,000 per month in royalties from a mine under development in Tongon.¹⁰ The Tongon site, which lies approximately sixty kilometers north of Korhogo (the capital of Savanes Region, in the north-central part of the country), is believed to be seven times the size of the Société des Mines d'Ity mine. Société des Mines d'Ity, located in Dix-Huit Montagnes Region and in the southern, government-controlled part of the country, is currently Côte d'Ivoire's largest gold mine. Although Randgold Resources denied having paid Fofié, it did admit to having engaged Cobagiex-Sécurité SARL, a private security company owned by Fofié, to guarantee the security of the Tongon project. In July 2009, Randgold Resources terminated its contract with Cobagiex-Sécurité SARL without explanation (UNSC 2009).

EXPLOITATION DURING THE 2010–2011 ELECTION CONFLICT

The post-election power struggle was not resolved for five agonizing months—until, in April 2011, Ouattara finally succeeded in assuming the presidency. Despite agreement among international authorities that Gbagbo had lost in a legitimate election, he was able to maintain a measure of power in the interim primarily because he continued to pay the salaries of government workers—to the tune of US\$50 million to US\$100 million per month—using funds seized

⁹ Even though conflict diamonds represent only a small part of the international diamond trade, they have serious consequences for peace, security, and sustainable development. The Kimberley Process, the principal international attempt to tackle the problem, was launched in May 2000 by southern African countries, in reaction to pressure from the international community—which, in addition to being concerned about peace and security, was eager to protect the diamond-dependent national economies of several countries, including Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. For more information on the Kimberley Process, see Bone (2012), Grant (2012), Mitchell (2012), and Wright (2012).

¹⁰ UNSC Resolution 1572 authorizes the use of economic sanctions against individuals who are directly or indirectly involved in supplying arms to rebel forces within Côte d'Ivoire (UNSC 2004). In 2006, to address Fofié's appropriation of tax revenues as funding for the FN, the UNSC sanctions committee imposed a travel ban on Fofié and froze his personal assets (UNSC 2009).

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from Ivoirian banks, as well as taxes that had been collected from Ivoirian natural resource industries.

When the Ivoirian banking industry, with international support, succeeded in shaking off Gbagbo's influence, Gbagbo intensified his financial demands on the natural resource sectors. For example, in early January 2011, Gbagbo began pressing the cocoa industry for multimillion-dollar "advances" on export taxes (Nossiter 2011). Phillip Carter, the U.S. ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire, described the situation as follows:

[Gbagbo] has been extorting local businesses to pay in advance their taxes, . . . putting increasing pressure on a variety of companies that are involved in natural resources, be it coffee, cocoa, petroleum, timber, whatever, to pay forward. They're resisting.

And so what we're seeing there is an effort for him to marshal as many resources as he can to get the money together to meet his payroll [and] probably to acquire additional weapons, to keep his fight going (U.S. DOS 2011).

As Gbagbo clung to power, the European Union (EU) began imposing sanctions on Ivoirian exports, and in mid-January (1) froze all the European assets of Côte d'Ivoire's two largest cocoa-exporting ports and (2) prohibited EU-registered vessels from engaging in financial transactions with those ports (Aljazeera 2011a). The following week, to cut off Gbagbo's funds, Ouattara called for a ban (which was initially for one month, and was later extended) on cocoa exports. He also announced his intent to prosecute and impose sanctions on any cocoa industry officials who supported Gbagbo (Aljazeera 2011b).

At first, Gbagbo scoffed at these measures; a spokesman said, "Isolation cannot work . . . Those who think that Côte d'Ivoire will be isolated are those who think that [we] have no choice but to operate with them" (Aljazeera 2011b). But in the months that followed, the effects of the ban on cocoa exports became difficult to ignore. As the struggle continued, 475,000 tons of cocoa—over one-third of Côte d'Ivoire's typical annual production—remained unshipped at Ivoirian ports (Aljazeera 2011a). In a communiqué read on state television, Gbagbo responded by announcing that the government would be the exclusive buyer of coffee and cocoa from farmers across the country (Rubinfeld 2011).

Two days later, Gbagbo announced that unless US\$138 million in anticipated tax proceeds from cocoa exports was collected by the end of the month, his government would seize an equivalent value in cocoa from the shipments that were being held in Ivoirian ports—which, at the time, were worth more than US\$1.5 billion (Oved 2011). Ivoirians were thus faced with two choices: having their cocoa seized by Gbagbo or risking prosecution and sanctions if Ouattara gained full control of Côte d'Ivoire. While many saw Gbagbo as having essentially nationalized the cocoa industry, Ouattara took a different view: "It's not nationalization. It's stealing. Because clearly as they did with the banks, now they are trying to rob people, businesses, both Ivorians and foreigners. Obviously they're not looking for the welfare of the people of Côte d'Ivoire . . ." (VOA 2011).

Ouattara's forces captured Gbagbo in early April 2011, before he could complete his takeover of Côte d'Ivoire's natural resource industries. Gbagbo had managed, however, to significantly disrupt the worldwide cocoa industry. At the peak of his influence, cocoa futures reached a thirty-two-year high, before plummeting upon the resumption of exports (Prentice and Roy 2011). In May, Ouattara was officially sworn in as president and quickly resumed cocoa exports (Aljazeera 2011c). By that time, a decade of conflict had claimed at least 3,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands, and the government and economy were in disarray.

REFORM EFFORTS

Ivoirians were not silent during the years of plunder by those in positions of power. Ivoirian civil society and national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have consistently advocated for reform in natural resource governance.

Publish What You Pay

Through an international coalition of NGOs called Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Ivoirian civil society has taken a stand against the lack of transparency—including a general disregard for reporting requirements—that has allowed the mismanagement of oil, gas, and mineral revenues to perpetuate poverty, conflict, and corruption.¹¹ In March 2006, the PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire coalition launched a campaign aimed at remedying opacity in the oil, gas, and mining sectors by educating citizens about corrupt government practices and mobilizing them to demand greater transparency in the management of these natural resources.¹² By pressing for the public disclosure of contracts, licensing agreements, company payments to the government, and government revenues from oil, gas, and mineral

¹¹ Launched in June 2002 and supported by more than 600 member organizations, PWYP has a simple goal: to ensure that extractive companies (oil, gas, and mining) publish, in a systematic and transparent way, the amount of taxes and license fees that they pay to host countries, and that governments, likewise, publish what they receive from such companies. In addition to enabling legislatures and citizens to ensure that government revenues are used to foster sustainable development, such transparency can also help to prevent embezzlement, corruption, and the illicit appropriation of resources—problems that are not uncommon in natural resource-rich countries with largely poor populations. See PWYP (n.d.).

¹² The goal of PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire (Coalition Ivoirienne Publiez Ce Que Vous Payez, or CI-PCQVP) is to increase transparency in the management of natural resources. The coalition is made up of the following civil society groups: Association des Femmes Juristes de CI, Centre d'Actions pour le Développement Social, COPAT-CI (Coalition pour le Plaidoyer Anti-Corruption et la Transparence en Côte d'Ivoire), DDD (Droits et Devoirs Démocratique), EDEN International, GCD (Gouvernance et Culture du Développement), Groupe de Recherche et de Plaidoyer sur les Industries Extractives, Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l'Homme, ONG Genre Développement et Droits Humains, ONG Human and Life, and Social Justice (CI-PCQVP n.d.).

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extraction, the campaign has helped Côte d'Ivoire move toward greater transparency in state budgetary practices and enabled citizens to hold the government accountable for its use of public revenues (CI-PCQVP n.d). In sum, the call for companies to “publish what they pay” and for governments to “publish what they receive” has given a boost to civil society in Côte d'Ivoire, increased transparency, and raised public expectations regarding access to information about the mining and hydrocarbon sectors.

The PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire campaign began with outreach and awareness-raising activities aimed at civil society and the media. Labor unions, journalists, and NGOs focused on environmental or human rights issues participated in several workshops on the importance of fighting corruption and pursuing transparency.¹³ Mobilization efforts also included informal public forums known as *agoras*, *parliaments*, or *assemblies*, which were organized by groups such as the National Federation of Speakers of Parliaments and Agoras of Côte d'Ivoire, the Union of Speakers of Parliaments of Côte d'Ivoire, and the Coordination of Parliaments and Agoras of Yopougon.¹⁴

The forums, which were held throughout the politico-military crisis and were attended mainly by young people, strengthened the groups that had convened them and increased popular support for transparency and good governance. The forums also gave the public an opportunity to take ownership of the PWYP campaign. The momentum created by the forums ultimately enabled PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire to bring Côte d'Ivoire into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Process (KP). (Côte d'Ivoire had technically been a member of the KP since 2003, but it had not been a fully engaged participant.)

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Côte d'Ivoire joined the EITI as a result of the efforts of PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire, which conducted a series of meetings with the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the National Assembly, advocating for the creation of a working group to develop measures to improve transparency. The working group was established, and—with leadership from PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire—proposed a legal framework for implementing the EITI.¹⁵ On February

¹³ Ivoirian journalists have played an essential role in disseminating recommendations and calls for reform in the natural resource sectors.

¹⁴ Yopougon is a neighborhood in Abidjan.

¹⁵ The goal of the EITI, which was launched in 2003, is to strengthen governance in natural resource-rich countries by requiring the publication and verification of (1) all payments made by extractive companies, and (2) all revenues that the state receives from those companies. Now an international coalition, the EITI includes governments; the World Bank Group; oil, gas, and mining companies; professional associations; investors; and civil society groups such as Global Witness, Oxfam, and Transparency International.

21, 2008, despite the National Assembly's refusal to vote on the proposed legislation, President Gbagbo signed a decree creating the National EITI Council; the decree was based, for the most part, on the bill written by the working group led by PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire. As the civil society member of the National EITI Council, PWYP-Côte d'Ivoire "is a driving force for the disclosure of state revenues from natural resource production" (BICC 2009, 37).

Since its establishment, the council has been working for the sustained application of EITI criteria in Côte d'Ivoire and for the achievement of EITI compliance.¹⁶ Thanks to the work of the council, the EITI board accepted Côte d'Ivoire as an EITI candidate country in May 2008. In March 2010, as part of its effort to comply with EITI requirements, the council adopted an action plan for 2008–2012 and issued Côte d'Ivoire's first EITI report (Conseil National ITIE Côte d'Ivoire 2010). The report, which includes detailed financial information on the oil and gas sectors for 2006 and 2007, was used to draft the 2008 national budget.

Such public use of information about natural resource revenues was a victory for those who had been working for transparency and good governance in Côte d'Ivoire.¹⁷ In April 2010, the council nominated a validator to lead the validation process that is required to achieve EITI compliance. In May 2013, Côte d'Ivoire became an EITI complaint country.

These accomplishments are not sufficient, but they do represent the government's growing awareness of the need to reform the oil, gas, and mining sectors. In July 2011, in a letter to the EITI chair, President Ouattara reconfirmed his government's commitment to the EITI.

Civil society and the Kimberley Process

The reform efforts of Ivoirian civil society have extended beyond the EITI. In 2008, to address mismanagement in the diamond industry, an Ivoirian civil society group—the Group for Research and Advocacy on Extractive Industries (Groupe de Recherche et de Plaidoyer sur les Industries Extractives, or GRPIE)—started a campaign to advocate for full participation in the KP. The mission of the GRPIE is to help stop the illicit trade of Ivoirian diamonds, while (1) taking into account

¹⁶ For the full list of EITI criteria, see EITI (n.d.).

¹⁷ In April 2006, the Oil Council/Committee, a governmental authority mandated to manage state revenues from oil and gas development, issued Decree No. 2006-68, with the goal of optimizing revenues from the hydrocarbon sector and monitoring their use. The committee issues quarterly reports to the Council of Ministers on physical and financial flows in the hydrocarbon sector (BICC 2009). In the March 2008 state budget, the government declared oil sector revenues of 14.5 billion CFA francs (approximately US\$30 million). Crucially, however, the information shared within the Oil Council/Committee and the Council of Ministers is not made available to the public (BICC 2009).

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the interests of miners and of communities in the extraction zones and (2) fully participating in the KP.

Côte d'Ivoire has been a formal member of the KP since 2003 and a consistent participant in the KP's plenary assemblies; however, Côte d'Ivoire is not yet in compliance with the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)¹⁸ due to the country's protracted conflict and the embargo on Ivoirian diamonds imposed by the UNSC in December 2005 (UNSC 2005).¹⁹ Leaders of the GRPIE believe that the KPCS could, if implemented fully, support peace and strengthen governance in Côte d'Ivoire.²⁰

Côte d'Ivoire, as of 2014, has put in place a number of procedures to meet KPCS requirements, many of which have already been integrated into laws and regulations, resulting in an overall legal framework in Côte d'Ivoire that on paper seeks to ensure compliance with the KPCS. Aware of these efforts, the UNSC—with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2153 on April 29, 2014—lifted the Ivoirian diamond embargo and encouraged Côte d'Ivoire to finalize a framework that would ensure a legal chain of custody for all rough diamonds (UNSC 2014).

In response to the lifting of the embargo and in preparation for the KP review mission, which is to take place “six months after the legal exportation of diamonds has resumed” (UNSC 2014, 2), Ivoirian authorities—with technical assistance from the GRPIE—undertook a diagnostic assessment of the country's artisanal and small-scale diamond production sector. Conducted between July and October 2014, this assessment was guided by the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF)(USAID 2014). The aim of the WDDF is to support the governments of diamond-producing countries in their efforts (1) to increase formalization of the artisanal and small-scale diamond sector and (2) to secure

¹⁸ KPCS is a tracking scheme developed by the KP to prevent rebel groups from profiting from the diamond trade.

¹⁹ In 2006, at its plenary assembly held in Gaborone, Botswana, the KP addressed the fact that, despite the embargo, Ivoirian diamonds were still being traded in world markets. Both government and industry were reluctant to increase oversight of the Ivoirian diamond trade; as a result, conflict diamonds entered legitimate, KP-certified markets after being smuggled across Côte d'Ivoire's borders. Neighboring countries—Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, in particular—have all been accused of serving as exit doors for Ivoirian diamonds during the embargo (PAC and Global Witness 2008; UNSC 2009). At its 2007 meeting in Brussels, Belgium, the KP reiterated its concern about Ivoirian diamonds entering the international diamond trade; the result was the creation of the Brussels Initiative, which encourages West African countries to collaborate in support of Côte d'Ivoire's efforts to control illegal trafficking in Ivoirian diamonds (KP 2007). Nevertheless, in 2008, illegal trafficking of Ivoirian diamonds continued, leading some to question the effectiveness of the initiative (Cullen 2013).

²⁰ Participation in the KPCS has led to governance improvements in other countries in the region, including Liberia.

the benefits from this greater formalization, as envisioned by the Washington Declaration (USAID 2013).²¹

According to reports, the government of Côte d'Ivoire has been seeking international support to create a bureau of diamond sales, which would be in charge of commercializing the production of Ivoirian diamonds. To be effective, however, the bureau must have the wherewithal to extend its authority throughout Côte d'Ivoire.

Governmental reform

Activism on the part of Ivoirian civil society, along with support from the international community, led the Gbagbo government to make some reform efforts. In November 2009, the National Secretariat for Governance and Capacity Building, which is affiliated with the cabinet of Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, officially launched the Support Program for Good Governance 2009–2013 (Programme d'Appui à la Bonne Gouvernance 2009–2013) (GOCI 2010). Jointly initiated by the government of Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the initiative is designed to strengthen democratic governance and public participation, build the institutional capacity of government agencies, incorporate gender and human rights considerations into policy decisions, and generally support peacebuilding and crisis prevention. An estimated budget of 37.7 billion CFA francs (approximately US\$83.8 million) has been assigned to the program (GOCI 2010).

The Support Program for Good Governance represents a significant step in the establishment of an institutional framework for promoting and implementing good governance in Côte d'Ivoire. As of 2014, the implementation of the program has been completed, and the program and corresponding funding has made it possible to develop the National Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan, which has resulted in the creation of a number of initiatives and programs fighting corruption.²²

²¹ Adopted by the KP plenary assembly in 2012, the Washington Declaration—formally known as the Washington Declaration on Integrating Development of Artisanal and Small Scale Diamond Mining with Kimberley Process Implementation—recognizes that the development of the artisanal and small-scale mining sector (ASM) through initiatives that formalize and improve the social conditions of ASM communities would be a strong incentive “to bring rough diamonds into legitimate chains of custody” (KP 2012, 1).

²² Such anti-corruption initiatives and programs include the creation of the High Authority for Good Governance and the National Anti-Corruption Secretariat by presidential decree on November 20, 2013; the launching of several communication campaigns for various social, economic and political stakeholders in 2013, aimed at raising awareness of the harmful effects of corruption; the planned establishment of the anti-corruption observatory and the Special Court to prevent and fight corruption; and planned initiatives to strengthen procurement management (GOCI 2014).

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE OUATTARA ADMINISTRATION

Notwithstanding the reform efforts described in the previous section, the Ouattara government faces a number of significant challenges: disarming excombatants; reconstituting administrative, military, and police authorities across the entire national territory; and restoring social services and infrastructure—which, because of the conflict, are insufficient in some regions and nonexistent in others.

After his inauguration in May 2011, Ouattara assigned top priority to social and political reconciliation (USIP 2011). As of this writing, however, tensions still persisted between different regions of the country. With the transition to the new government, most of the previously displaced farmers felt safe enough to return to their farms; however, thousands of cocoa farmers from the Guéré ethnic group continue to live in refugee camps because the Forces Républicaines, the military arm of the Ouattara administration, is posted near their lands in the western part of the country (Cocks and Aboa 2011).

Another major concern for the Ouattara government is the presence of large numbers of Gbagbo supporters, including members of violent militias, in refugee camps just across the border, in Liberia. In August 2011, an attack by one of Gbagbo's militias in a southwestern area of the country left twenty-three dead (Burke 2011). Left unresolved, continued tensions and isolated violence could reignite widespread conflict.

Despite these challenges (and months of post-election violence), Ouattara's government has received strong international support for reconstruction and economic recovery. The International Monetary Fund plans to provide a ten-year loan of US\$617 million, at 0 percent interest (Reuters Africa 2011). And on September 24, 2011, the World Bank and the African Development Bank reaffirmed their commitment to support Côte d'Ivoire's reconstruction and reconciliation program: "Within this framework, development partners will work with the government of Côte d'Ivoire to put the country back on the path of reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point, which includes the critical need for reform of the cocoa sector; establishing long term shared growth, and regaining its economic leadership role in the sub-region" (AFDB 2011). The Ouattara government offers hope for improved natural resource management, which will support the continued transition from post-conflict stabilization to sustainable development.

CONCLUSION

Despite a protracted economic and political crisis, the Ivoirian economy succeeded in transitioning from a reliance on agriculture to a reliance on mineral revenues—a shift that can be viewed as a step toward stability and economic development. Nevertheless, in a pattern that has recurred all too often in West Africa, illegal exploitation of natural resources enabled violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, forestalling the peace and stability that are necessary for economic development.

During the politico-military crisis, management failures, nepotism, and corruption led to the misappropriation of natural resource revenues, which were then used to support the military activities of both the government and rebel factions. Recognizing that the proper use of natural resource revenues is central to positioning the country for peace and economic development, Ivoirian civil society has partnered with international organizations to pressure the government for reform. While acknowledging that the nation faces manifold difficulties, the reform efforts have focused on transparency as a necessary first step in eventually addressing other problems more directly. The reforms undertaken by the post-conflict Ivoirian government offer an opportunity to progress toward the transparency that is a precursor of good natural resource governance—which, in turn, offers the promise of freeing the Ivoirian people from the vicious cycle of mismanagement and conflict that has forestalled development for so long.

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